第76章 Letter XIX(1)

Sir ,As the means then of influencing by prerogative,and of governing by force,were considered to be increased formerly,upon every increase of power to the crown,so are the means of influencing.by money,and of governing by corruption,to be considered as increased now,upon that increase of power which hath accrued to the crown by the new constitution of the revenue since the Revolution.Nay farther.Not only the means of corrupting are increased,on the part of the crown,but the facility of employing these means with success is increased,on the part of the people,on the part of the electors,and of the elected.Nay,farther still.These means and this facility are not only increased,but the power of the crown to corrupt,as I have hinted already,and the proneness of the people to be corrupted,must continue to increase on the same principles,unless a stop be put to the growing wealth and power of one,and the growing depravity of the other.We are,to be sure,in no danger from any advantage his majesty will take of this situation;but if advantage be not taken in favour of our constitution,of the present most happy reign,of the mild and beneficent temper of our heroical monarch,of the generous principle,instilled by nature,and improved by philosophy,of his royal consort,it may be supposed,for we speak hypothetically all along,as the reader will please to remember,even where the precaution is not used;it may be supposed,I say,that pretended friends to the government,and real enemies to this constitution,no matter whether they are such by principle,or become such by the crimes,will get into superior power,in some future time,and under some weak or wicked prince:and whenever this happens,the subversion of our constitution,and of our liberty by consequence,will be the most easy enterprise imaginable;because nothing can be more easy than the creation of an anti-constitutional dependency of the two houses of Parliament on the crown will be in that case;and because such a dependency of the two houses is as real a subversion of our constitution as an absolute abolishment of Parliaments would be.

The first of those means of corruption,that have grown up,or been increased,since the Revolution,which I shall mention,is the establishment of the civil list;not so much on account of the manner in which it was originally given,as on account of that in which it hath been since given,and of the vast augmentations that have been made to it;augmentations,that may be doubled or trebled,in times to come,upon the same motives,under the same and other pretences;in short,just as speciously as they have been made.

The revenue of King James the Second,as it stood at his abdication,hath been mentioned;and it would not be hard to show,by indisputable computations,that they who apprehended he might be able to govern without Parliaments,or to buy Parliaments,if he wanted their assistance,had good reason for such apprehensions,notwithstanding the expense he was at,over and above all the ordinary charges of the government,in maintaining against law a great standing army of sixteen or eighteen thousand men.But to go back to the reign of King Charles the Second,whose revenue was much less.The patriots of that age,even when this revenue was computed at no more than one million two hundred thousand pounds a year,took great alarm at the pecuniary influence it might create,and looked upon it,and spoke of it,as a fund for corruption.

Now,if this revenue could afford a fund for corruption,when,besides maintaining the honour and dignity of the crown,it was to defray all the other expenses of the state,and among the rest,those of a small army,and a great fleet;what would the same patriots think of a revenue of eight hundred thousand pounds,or a million a year,applicable to the particular expenses of the crown alone,and not one farthing of which sacred treasure was ever diverted to any national use?They would have the same just confidence,no doubt,as we have in his present majesty;but they would say as we do,that so immense a private,or separate revenue,may become hereafter an inexhaustible fund of corruption:and therefore that the independency of Parliaments is,and must be in real danger,till some remedies,as effectual against the pecuniary influence,as have been found against the prerogative of the crown,are provided.

They would show that a small sum,in aid of places and pensions,of fears and expectations,might serve for the ordinary charge of annual corruption;and that a small saving reserved every year might produce,at the end of seven,a fund sufficient for the extraordinary charge of septennial and national corruption.