第75章 Letter XVIII(4)

Our Kings,instead of contributing most,have contributed nothing to the public charge;and the people of Britain,instead of giving occasionally aids to the crown,have taken upon themselves the whole load of ordinary and extraordinary expenses,for which they annually provide.Notwithstanding this vast alteration in the state of the revenue,and the interest of the King and the people in the management of it,the same forms of granting aids to the crown,and of levying taxes,and of managing the public treasure,have been continued;so that the people stand obliged (for the crown,that is trusted with the whole,is bound for nothing)to make good all deficiencies,though they have no share in the management of the revenue.Our Kings,since the establishment of the civil list,have not only a private and separate estate,but receive a kind of rent-charge out of the public estate,to maintain their honour and dignity,nothing else:and whether the public estate thrive,or not,this rent-charge must be made good to them;at least,as it hath been settled on our present most gracious monarch,if the funds appropriated produce the double of that immense revenue of eight hundred thousand pounds a year,which hath been so liberally given him for life,the whole is his,without account;but if they fail in any degree to produce it,the entire national fund is engaged to make up the difference.But although our Kings have thus no longer any immediate interest in the public estate,they are trusted with the entire management of it.They are not only stewards for the public,but they condescend to be such for all those private persons,who are the creditors of the public,and have the additional trouble of managing about three millions a year,on this head.

Now this new settlement,which appears absurd in speculation,how wise soever it may have been thought contrived for practice,hath had this evident and inevitable consequence.As we have annually increased our funds,and our taxes,we have annually increased the power of the crown;and these funds and taxes being established and laid for perpetuity,or for terms equivalent to perpetuity,in the sense here intended,this increase of power must not only continue,but still increase,as long as the system of economy subsists.

How this increase of power arises from the increase of funds and taxes,and the influence of the crown grows,in proportion to the burden on the people,heavier,hath been explained so much in the debates on a late detestable occasion,that much less needs to be said on the subject here.If we consider,in the increase of taxes,nothing more than the increase of officers first,by which a vast number of new dependants on the crown are created in every part of the kingdom (dependants as numerous,and certainly more prevalent than all the tenants and wards of the crown were anciently);and secondly,the powers given to the treasury,and other inferior officers,on account of these taxes,which are at least as great and as grievous,in this free government of ours,as any that are exercised in the most arbitrary government,on the same occasions;if we consider this alone,we shall find reason sufficient to conclude,that although the power of prerogative was more open,and more noisy in its operations,yet the power thus acquired is more real and may prove more dangerous for this very reason,because it is more covered,and more silent.That men began to see,very soon after the Revolution,the danger arising from hence to our constitution,as I said above,is most certain.

No less than seven Acts were made,in King William's reign,to prevent undue influences on elections;and one of the Acts,as I remember,for I have it not before me,is grounded on this fact,'that the officers of the excise had frequently,by threats and promises,prevailed on electors,and absolutely debarred them of the freedom of voting'.What hath been done,or attempted to be done,since that time,in the same view,and what hath been done,or attempted to be done,both in the reign of King William and since,to prevent an undue influence on the elected,as well as on the electors,I need not recapitulate.They are matters of fresh date,and enough known.Upon the whole,this change in the state and property of the public revenue hath made a change in our constitution,not yet perhaps attended to sufficiently,but such an one however as deserves our utmost attention,since it gives a power,unknown in former times,to one of the three estates;and since public liberty is not guarded against the dangers that may arise from this power,as it was,and as it is now more than ever,against the dangers that used to arise from the powers formerly possessed or claimed by the crown.Formerly,prerogative was kept in sight,and provisions were made against the effects and encroachments of it,as often as occasion required,and opportunity offered.They who called themselves friends to the government,in those days,opposed these provisions.

They who were friends to the constitution,promoted them.That the same thing should happen again,in a similar case,we must expect.But as the friends of the constitution,in times past,were not deterred,tempted,nor wearied,whilst they defended it against dangers of one kind,and by their honest perseverance delivered it,down,not only safe,but more improved,to posterity;let us flatter ourselves with this agreeable hope,that the friends of the constitution,at this time,and in all times to come,will be neither deterred,tempted,not wearied in the same generous cause,in watching and guarding it against dangers of another kind;and that they will deliver it down,in like manner,to future generations.Sure I am there are reasons,and those of no small moment,why they should be more watchful,more upon their guard,more bold,and more incessant in their endeavours,if possible,even than the assertors of British liberty were formerly;and the enumeration of some of these reasons is an article not to be omitted on this occasion.

I am,sir,etc.