托马斯·阿奎那研究

Analogical Mentality and Aquinas’ Way of Thinking

Antonio Olmi[1]

Abstract：Is there such a thing as “natural reason？” From a realistic point of view，it seems hardly disputable to admit the existence of a common human nature：otherwise，how could we speak about mankind as a whole？How could we identify a human being，when we meet one？The most relevant and distinctive quality of human nature is reason：“natural” reason，because it belongs to everyone，whatever their place of birth，their culture，and the historical period of their life. The universal validity of natural reason is founded on an intuitive grasp of the so-called “first principles of knowledge”；and，in order to draw from them logically and ethically coherent conclusions，it is necessary to adopt an appropriate mode of thought-an appropriate “mentality”. In the development of the Western culture it is possible to identify four “mentalities”：the “analytical” mentality，the “synthetic” mentality，the “dialectic” mentality，the “analogical” mentality. Univocal mentalities（especially analytical and dialectical）have not led the West to the attainment of wisdom，but rather have distorted and diverted the Western quest for truth；the real greatness of the Western culture can only be appreciated through a deep understanding and an intense practice of the analogical mentality，the best example of which is to be found in the work of St.Thomas Aquinas.

Keywords：Human Nature；Natural Reason；First Principles of Knowledge

What is “Natural Reason”？

Quite a few contemporary Western philosophers and opinion-makers believe that，although the existence of “nature” in the physical sense cannot be put into discussion，there is no such thing as “nature” in the anthropological sense：man is the ever-changing product of himself，of his history，of his own creative capacity of self-transcending. According to this view，there is nothing “essential” in common among all human beings：“mankind” is only a generic expression，and its members are “human” because of certain behavioural features，which could also be exhibited by animals or machines.[2]

On the contrary，another certitude is deeply rooted in the Western tradition：namely，that human beings necessarily possess a set of qualities belonging to everyone，whatever their place of birth，their culture，and the historical period of their life. Such qualities characterize “mankind” as such，and may be referred to as “human nature”：which is the fundamental “anthropological constant” whereby we can communicate，know each other，and develop the universal virtue of benevolence.[3]

From this point of view，“human nature” has been defined in multifarious ways. The most profound and relevant of them indicates reason as the essential constituent of human beings：man is a “rational animal”，an “animal endowed with reason”.[4] Unlike other animals，which are driven by instinct and strictly bound by their immediate needs，man can elevate himself to a universal knowledge of things；he can “know the truth”-that is to say，he can “adapt his intellect to reality”.[5]

Aristotle was the first，in the history of Western philosophy，to grasp clearly that the essence of man consists in the faculty of reason. He stated that，atop of the vegetative element shared with plants，and the sensitive element shared with animals，human life is guided by a superior principle：to which the irrational part of the human soul has the tendency “to obey as one does one’s father.”[6]

The Stoics accepted such doctrine，and established a neat distinction between animals and man：

nature’s rule for animals is to follow the direction of impulse，but “when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational，for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life.”[7]

This conception of man featuring “natural reason” became one of the cornerstones of Western classical culture and anthropology. As Cicero said，“of course reason，by which alone we excel the beasts，through which we are effective in［drawing］inferences，through which we prove，disprove，discuss，demonstrate something，make conclusions-it certainly is in common，differing in education，while decidedly equal in the capacity to learn.”[8]

St.Augustine of Hippo，while discerning two levels of rationality-the “upper ratio”，whichrelates to what is eternal and immutable，and the “lower ratio”，which relates to what is subject to time and becoming-perfectly agreed with the Aristotelian and Stoic conception of natural reason：that is，“a mental operation with the power to distinguish between，and to connect，things to learn.”[9]

Human beings are mortal，and subjected to change within a very short time：but reason is eternal. “One to two equals two to four is the truest ratio（another name for reason）. It was not truer yesterday than it is today，nor will it be truer tomorrow，or in a year’s time. It would not cease to be true even if the world came to an end.”[10]

The classical Western idea of reason-which，in a philosophical-realistic perspective，seems to be rather self-evident and hardly disputable-found its clearest and widest explanation in St.Thomas Aquinas’ thought. He distinguished between “reason” and “intellect”：they refer to the same cognitive faculty，but “intellect takes its name from being an intimate penetration of the truth，while reason is so called from being inquisitive and discursive.”[11]“To understand” is simply to apprehend intelligible truth，while “to reason” is to advance from one thing understood to another；“reasoning，therefore，is compared to understanding，as movement is to rest，or acquisition to possession；of which one belongs to the perfect，the other to the imperfect. And since movement always proceeds from something immovable，and ends in something at rest；hence it is that human reasoning，by way of inquiry and discovery，advances from certain things simply understood-namely，the first principles；and，again，by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles，in the light of which it examines what it has found.”[12]

Therefore，according to this conception，the universal validity of “natural” reason is founded on an intuitive grasp of the so-called “first principles”：which are the original and fundamental certainties of human knowledge. Every chain of reasoning starts from them，every argumentation assumes them；even those who deny these certainties make reference，albeit implicitly，to them，because it is impossible to orient oneself in reality without their help.

Of course，since the first principles of natural reason are the ultimate criteria of all demonstrations，they cannot be demonstrated. As Aristotle says about the most evident of them，the principle of non-contradiction：“Some indeed demand thateven this shall be demonstrated，but this they do through want of education，for not to know of what things one should demand demonstration，and of what one should not，argues want of education. For it is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything（there would be an infinite regress，so that there would still be no demonstration）；but if there are things of which one should not demand demonstration，these persons could not say what principle they maintain to be more self-evident than the present one.”[13]

Because of the intuitive nature of their knowledge，the first principles cannot be completely systematized：that is，definitively arranged in a set of formally expressed prepositions. Indeed，in the history of Western philosophy there have been more attempts to deny them，futilely trying to build new starting points for human thought，than to explore them thoroughly in all the vastness of their implications.[14]

During the past century，Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange summarized the first principles of human reason in the following list. First，the principle of identity：“what is is，what is not is not”；otherwise，“each thing is the same with itself and different from another.” Second，the principle of non-contradiction：“it is impossible for something to belong and not to belong to the same thing at the same time and in the same respect”；or else “contradictory statements cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time.” Third，the principle of substance：“what exists remains the same，under multifarious and transient ways of being”；which means that “a substance is distinct from its properties”，and that “a thing-in-itself is a property-bearer，to be distinguished from the properties it bears”. Fourth，the principle of the reason of being：“every being has a reason of its existence either in itself or in something else.” Fifth，the principle of causality：“every effect has a cause.” Sixth，the principle of finality：“every agent acts for an end.” Seventh，the principle of induction：“the same cause，in the same conditions，always produces the same effect.” Eighth，the principle of synderesis（or the first principle of practical reason）：“good is to be done and pursued，evil is to be avoided.”[15]

The list may slightly vary，because the same principles can be highlighted and mutually ordered in different ways. AntonioLivi，for example，speaking of “common sense” preferred to put four “existential realities”（the world，the self，freedom，God）before the classically renown “cognitive principles”（non-contradiction，causality，finality）.[16] However，at the height of the Western reflection on the foundations of natural reason we could place these words of St John Paul Ⅱ：“Although times change and knowledge increases，it is possible to discern a core of philosophical insight within the history of thought as a whole. Consider，for example，the principles of non-contradiction，finality and causality，as well as the concept of the person as a free and intelligent subject，with the capacity to know God，truth and goodness. Consider as well certain fundamental moral norms which are shared by all. These are among the indications that，beyond different schools of thought，there exists a body of knowledge which may be judged a kind of spiritual heritage of humanity. It is as if we had come upon an implicit philosophy，as a result of which all feel that they possess these principles，albeit in a general and unreflective way. Precisely because it is shared in some measure by all，this knowledge should serve as a kind of reference-point for the different philosophical schools. Once reason successfully intuits and formulates the first universal principles of being and correctly draws from them conclusions which are coherent both logically and ethically，then it may be called right reason or，as the ancients called it，orthós logos，recta ratio.”[17]

Four Uses of Reason in The Western Culture

In order to think “rightly”，that is，to draw “logically and ethically coherent conclusions” from the first universal principles of reason，it is necessary to adopt an appropriate mode of thought：which，in lack of a better word，we could name “mindset”，or “mentality”. In this context，we intend “mentality” as a way of thinking，based on a specific “cognitive attitude”：that is to say，on a peculiar “disposition to know” that involves not only the human mind but the person as a whole.

In the development of the Western culture it is possible to identify four clearly distinct “mentalities”，in the above sense：the “analytical” mentality，the “synthetic” mentality，the “dialectic” mentality，the “analogical” mentality. They are mutually excluding，and each of them orients the movement of reasoning to a different direction，enabling it to obtain different results.

The most typically “Western” of them，to the point of being identified with “the” Western mentality par excellence，is the analytical mentality. “Analysis” means，in general，the description and interpretation of a situation，or of any object，in terms of the simplest elements belonging to the object or situation in question. In other words，“to analyze” something means to break it，to divide it，to resolve it into more easily understandable elements. The analytic mentality leads，in any field of knowledge，to reduce the totality to a sum of parts，to reduce these to smaller parts，and so on until reaching to elements not further decomposable；and then to reassemble them，so as to understand the whole as the sum of its parts.

Analytical thinkers have a marked preference for “clear and distinct ideas” in the manner of Descartes，from which they seek to expunge any traces of ambiguity or imprecision；[18] they aspire to conceptual and linguistic univocality，which they consider essential in order to attain a scientific understanding of reality.

Mathematics as we know it，that is to say，a rigorous and formalized consideration of abstract quantities，was born thanks to the analytical disposition of mind of the ancient Greek thinkers. Modern science，which intends to build and organize knowledge in the form of testable explanations and predictions about the universe，is a systematic enterprise proceeding through the conceptual “desassembling” and “reassembling” of the objects of its research.

The analytical mentality however，if radically pursued，makes it very difficult to come back to totality and to find a holistic perspective again；when you try to recompose the parts into which reality has been decomposed，it becomes problematic to recover the “sense of the whole”，and the cognitive intuitions enabled by such knowledge.[19]

“Synthesis” is，in a sense，exactly the opposite of analysis；it can be considered as the process going from the simple to the complex，that is，from single elements to their combinations，from the parts to the whole. The synthetic mentality consists in aiming for a holistic unity of knowledge，even embracing，in a panoramic view，disparate and heterogenous elements otherwise difficult to correlate with each other.

Synthetic thinkers tend to widen more and more their own point of view，until it becomes capable of framing all known reality in a unified outlook，always open to the “perspective of the whole”. From such perspective it can easily appear that，almost magically，“everything has something in common with everything else and everything is connected with everything else.”[20]

In the Western tradition such mentalityhas produced its most significant results in the fields of philosophy，literature，and art in general. Every systematic philosopher has tried to explain all aspects of reality from one overarching principle；every great poet，or writer，or painter，or musician has presented his own world conception from one personal-but at the same time universal and all-embracing-point of view.

To live radically this cognitive disposition，however，leads to an intolerance for details，for too narrow research areas，for petty and insignificant specialistic studies. The synthetic mentality may lead to an excessively genericunderstanding of reality，failing to account for the deep differences among things，and among the laws which rule their relationships.[21]

According to Western classical philosophy，“dialectic” is a form of reasoning resulting from the struggle or contrast of two opposing aspects of reality，or concepts，or principles. It can be defined as a “mode of thought，or a philosophic medium，through which contradiction becomes a starting point（rather than a dead end）for contemplation.”[22] Dialectic can be “mediated”，or “non-mediated”：in the first case，the opposing terms are unified in a synthesis，which in turn becomes an element of a new antithetical couple；in the second case，they continue to face each other in a neverending process，which divides them without uniting them，and unites them just because it divides them.[23]

Amongst cognitive dispositions，the dialectical mentality is the way of knowledge which first identifies fundamental “contradictions” in reality，then tries to explain reality itself through the dynamism of such radical oppositions. Dialectical thinkers tend to consider all that exists in terms of antagonistic elements：whether they be cosmic forces，social classes，ontological or logical or psychological principles.

The most significant results of the Western dialectical mentality are to be found in the fields of philosophy and historiography. Well present in the ancient Greek philosophy，with Hegel dialectic became the fundament of anomnicomprehensive conception of reality；the method of which-a three-step process comprising the movement from “thesis”（a clearly delineated concept）to “antithesis”（its opposite）to “synthesis”（resolving their opposition into an embracing resolution）-has deeply influenced，and continues to influence，the Western（mostly European）culture.[24] Also the work of modern historians appears to be orientated by a dialectical disposition of mind：especially when they understand the linear flow of time as a succession of conflicting ages，or periods，or phases，marked by breakthroughs and dramatic changes.

Dialectical thinkers，however，run the risk of crystallizing the manifold becoming of things into a rigid and reductive oppositional scheme：which，in addition to distorting reality，lends itself to the easy manipulations of ideology.[25]

The word “analogy”，in its wider meaning，indicates a relationship of similarity among some elements of two events or objects，from which is possible to infer a certain degree of similarity between the events or objects in themselves.[26] The idea of “knowledge by similarity”，which lies behind such definition of analogy，is not easy to frame in a univocal definition；there are different kinds of analogy which we must consider，before we can answer the question：what is an “analogical” disposition of thought？

First，there is “logical analogy”：it regards names，and the concepts meant by names. From the perspective of logic，analogy is a property of concepts：according to which they are predicated of their subjects in a sense that is partly equal and partly different.[27] On this level，analogy represents the “plurivocal” possibility of predication，which is intermediate between the extremes of “univocality”（one word has only one meaning）and “equivocality”（one word has several distinct meanings）.[28]

Second，there is “metaphysical analogy”，which refers to similarities among things. The metaphysical foundation of analogy is that certain perfections of reality can be held by distinct subjects in different ways：different modes of being determine distinct modes of signification. Analogous notions，therefore，express perfections which are achieved in various ways，by diverse subjects，in disparate areas of reality.[29]

Third，there is “gnoseological analogy”：the use of analogy in the formation of human knowledge. Given that the sources of our knowledge are：intellectual abstraction（outward-looking，is the operation that grants us the primitive concepts of material things）；consciousness（inward-looking，follows abstraction as a reflex action，and gives us the primitive concepts of ourselves and the proper concepts of logic）；judgement（composes the information provided by abstraction and consciousness in new complexes）；reasoning（the process by which new knowledge is obtained by already known truths）-we can say that，apart from the initial act of intellectual abstraction，every moment of the acquisition of human knowledge is closely dependent on a previous knowledge of other realities，which have some relationship of similarity with it.[30]

Fourth，there is “rhetorical analogy”：how is understood by argumentation theories，namely by the “new rhetoric” of Ch. Perelman and L.Obrechts-Tyteca.[31] Such kind of analogy is defined as an argument technique，which consists not so much in a relationship of similarity，as in a similarity of relationships. If A is to B as C is to D，Perelman and Tyteca call “theme” the set of terms A and B，and “phoros” the set of terms C and D；in the process of argumentation，the theme and the phoros belong to different fields，and the phoros is better known than the theme，the structure and value of which it helps to clarify.

The cognitive disposition which lies behind this fourfold use of analogy can be called analogical mentality. To think that way means to recognize that reality can simultaneously be considered as a whole，as a set of distinct elements，and as an ordered structure in which all elements have their own place，on different levels of perfection.

Reflecting on reality，the analytical mentality sees the distinction between its components；the synthetic mentality notes their wholeness；the dialectical mentality emphasizes the conflict that opposes them against each other. But only the analogical mentality can grasp simultaneously the relationships of distinction，unity，and order which tie together all the aspects of reality；and only if you think analogically can you grasp the deepest similarities between things，put them in relation，and so increase your understanding of their nature.

The greatest problem with “knowledge by similarity” is its（relative）imprecision. Trying to know something by means of its similarity to something else may fall too short，or too far，as regards its true nature；besides，such comprehension is highly intuitive，and can neither be exactly formulated nor easily communicated. For this reason in the Western culturethe development of modern science，from the sixteenth century on，led to the abandonment of the analogical mentality，predominant in the Middle Ages，in favour of the analytical mentality：much better suited to the formation of “clear and distinct” ideas，indispensable so as to control and manipulate the material world.

However，if one is not interested in mere “science”，that is the theoretical command on reality in order to manipulate it，but wishes to achieve “wisdom，” that isthe contemplative look at reality in order to come into harmony with it，one has to adopt the analogical mentality. St.Augustine of Hippo and St.Thomas Aquinas in the fields of philosophy and theology，and Dante Alighieri in the field of poetry，were probably the most outstanding figures in the Western culture who succeeded in grasping the unity-distinction-ordering relationships between man，the world，and God.

Analogy as a Key for The Understanding of Aquinas’ Way of Thinking

In his impressive work St.Thomas Aquinas often speaks about analogy from the logical perspective，[32] which is strictly connected with the metaphysical point of view.[33] Actually，in Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy analogy is considered as the logical complement of the ontological order，which allows to preserve the richness and multiplicity of reality by extending knowledge to fields far removed from each other.[34]

The most relevant description of this kind of logical-metaphysical analogy is perhaps to be found in Summa Theologiae（or Summa Theologica，“The Whole of Theology”），First Part，Question 13，Article 5：in which Aquinas speaks about “Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them”. There are here two terms of predication-the supreme Reality of God，and the reality of all that exists-which seem impossible to be linked together：neither the analytical，nor the synthetic，nor the dialectical way of reasoning could justify speaking of God with the same concepts and words that derive from natural experience（the only ones we have at our disposal）without reducing God to the level of creation. The God of Western（not only Christian）tradition，considered in His own nature，which utterly transcends the world，would therefore remain unknowable and definitely unspeakable.

St.Thomas would seem to agree：“Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause，receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree，but in a measure that falls short，so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply，and in the same manner；as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things.”[35]

Nevertheless，“all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied，pre-exist in Godunitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature，it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections；as，for instance，by the term ‘wise’ applied to man，we signify some perfection distinct from a man’s essence，and distinct from his power and existence，and from all similar things；whereas when we apply to it God，we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence，or power，or existence.”[36]

Here we see the analogical mentality at work：it deals with terms to which it attributes a twofold meaning，one referred to creature，another referred to God-but such meanings are not completely different from each other，are not one and the same，are not a couple of contradictories：they are similar，that is partly identical and partly different. “Thus also this term ‘wise’ applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified；whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God；but it leaves the thing signified as uncomprehended，and as exceeding the signification of the name.Hence it is evident that this term ‘wise’ is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.”[37]

The exclusion of theunivocality of terms，however，goes hand in hand with the exclusion of their equivocality. “Neither［…］are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense，as some have said. Because if that were so，it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all；for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers，who proved many things about God，and also against what the Apostle says：‘The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made’（Rom 1：20）. Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense，i.e. according to proportion.”[38]

St.Thomas，then，distinguishes between two kinds of logical-metaphysical analogy：the “analogy by attribution，” and the “analogy by proportionality.” “Now names，” he says，“are thus used in two ways：either according as many things are proportionate to one，thus for example ‘healthy’ predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body，of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause”[39]（this is the analogy by attribution），“or according as one thing is proportionate to another，thus ‘healthy’ is said of medicine and animal，since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body”[40]（this is the analogy by proportionality）.

The second type is the one suited to speak about God：“in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically，and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures. Thus whatever is said of God and creatures，is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause，wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently.”[41]

This most significant exposition closes with afurther clarification of what “analogy” means：“Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not，as it is in univocals，one and the same，yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals；but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing；thus ‘healthy’ applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health，and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.”[42]

The logical-metaphysical concept of analogy is not simply a mental artifact，which Aquinas uses to legitimize the possibility of speaking of God in human words；it stems directly from the basic notion of “participation，” which is the central pillar of the Thomistic philosophical-theological system and gives it “the character of ultimate synthesis of［Western］classical and Christian thought.”[43]

The concept of participation belongs originally to Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophy. Plato uses this term to explain the relationship between the sensible world and the ideal world，considering material things as participations of ideal paradigms：for instance，good things “participate” of beauty，good things “participate” of goodness，human beings “participate” of humanity.

St.Thomas gives the name of “participation” to one of the first principles of natural reason，the principle of causality：“Now participating is almost a taking part. Hence：（a）Whenever something particularly receives what pertains universally to something else，it is said to participate in it. For instance，man is said to participate in animal，since it does not have the account of animal in its full generality. Socrates participates in man for the same reason.（b）The subject likewise participates in its accident，and so does matter in form，since the substantial or accidental form，which is common in virtue of its account，is determined to this or that subject.（c）The effect is similarly said to participate in its cause，especially when it isn’t equal to the power of its cause-e.g. when we say that air ‘participates’ in sunlight because it doesn’t receive it with the brightness there is in the sun.”[44]

But to explain causality by means of participation is not simply to use a Platonic formula rather than an Aristotelian one；it is to conceive the relationship between cause and effect in a deeper way. The concept of participation highlights both the similarity between cause and effect，since the effect possesses the same quality of the cause，and the difference between them，since the effect can possess only a part of the reality of the cause.

Such acknowledgement of both similarity and difference within the process of causality refers to the analogical structure of reality：the simultaneous interdependence of unity-distinction-ordering，namely the “relationship of relationships” whose terms are united but not confused，distinct but not divided，united and distinct not on a level of undifferentiated equality but within a hierarchical disposition. The very possibility of thinking analogically-in the fourfold sense of “logical”，“metaphysical”，“gnoseological”，and “rhetorical” analogy-depends on the existence of such a structure；which，according to the Christian Revelation，is rooted in the mystery of the Holy Trinity，that is，the mystery of the relationships between the divine Persons of the Father，the Son，and the Holy Spirit.[45]

Although St.Thomas’ style of thought is analogical，his style of argumentation is often analytical. He prefers “demonstrative” discourse to “persuasive” discourse，and likes to articulate the logical steps of his reasoning in an inferential way；therefore，the deeply analogical nature of Aquinas’ mentality is，somehow，hidden. One may be wondering：has it ever happened that analogic reason has deployed the power of its metaphysical foundation and logical structure through the channel of its gnoseological function and rhetorical ways of expression？

We can mention at least one case in which one disciple of St Thomas’ was able to make a clear reference to reality considered as a simultaneous unity-and-distinction betweenhierarchized levels，by means of an “empathic”，not strictly rational，approach. We are speaking of Matteo Ricci；whose masterpiece was The True Meaning of “Lord of Heaven”（《天主实义》）.[46] This work，published in Beijing in 1603，is a long dialogue between a “Western Literatus”（西士），the alter ego of Ricci’s himself，and a “Chinese Literatus”（中士），the alter ego of the Chinese mandarins with whom the Jesuit missionary was in friendly relations；its aim is to show the reasonableness of the Christian faith，starting from the universal foundations of natural reason.

Reading this book one never meets the name of St.Thomas Aquinas，or an explicit quotation from a work of his. But the standpoint，and the philosophical-theological structure of thought，of the “Western Literatus” is exactly the same of St.Thomas；particularly，as it is expressed in Summa Theologiae.[47] Thus，Ricci’s approach to God，the world，and man is thoroughly Thomistic，that is to say，strictly analogical both in form（in the sense of “logical analogy”）and in content（in the sense of “metaphysical analogy”）.

In this “Catechism”，however，which tries to apply Aquinas’ sapiential achievements to the missionary field，analogy is also used ingnoseological and rhetorical sense：the “Western Literatus” intends to open the Christian perspective on the way to wisdom to the “Chinese Literatus”，appealing not only to his mind but also to his heart. So，he has to promote the knowledge of something unknown（the Doctrine of the Lord of Heaven）by means of something known（the natural intuition of reality）；and，in order to achieve such progress，he has to use well chosen similarities between a “theme” concerning God，the world，man considered from the Christian perspective，and a “phoros” inspired by a natural-i.e. universally recognized and recognizable-point of view.

When the theme refers to the oneness of God，the phoros refers to an earthly sovereign：God is to the world，as a ruler is to the nation he rules.[48] When the theme refers to God as the cause of all that exists，the phoros refers to an artisan：God is to the universe，as a craftsman is to “a small globe cast in bronze［which］depicts sun，moon，stars，planets，mountains，seas and the ten thousand beings.”[49] When the theme refers to God as He who makes the order of reality，the phoros refers to an helmsman and the boat he pilots，[50] to an architect and the house he has built，[51] to a conductor and his orchestra，to the head and its body，to a father and his family，[52] to a ruler and his nation，[53] to an archer and his target.[54] When the theme refers to the divine attributes of omniscience，benevolence，and justice，the phoros is taken from the fields of perception，of family life，of the administration of justice：God is to man，as a Great Eye is to things，as a Great Ear is to sounds，as a Big Foot is to the road，as parents are to their good son，as a judge is to a criminal.[55]

In order to deepen the natural knowledge of man towards the perspective of Christian wisdom，when Ricci refers the theme to the human unhappy condition he refers the phoros to a boat in a stormy ocean，and to a castaway after a shipwreck.[56] Besides，when he refers the theme to the present life of man he refers the phoros to the situation of an examinee on the day of the examination，[57] to the role of an actor in a stage representation，[58] to the state of a wayfarer while along the road；[59] when he refers the theme to the future life of man he refers the phoros to the state of a wayfarer who has finally arrived home.[60] Man is to his reason and righteousness，as a bird is to its wings；[61] human nature is to its capabilities，as gold is to its possible uses[62] Human mind is to material body，as a sparrow is to the tree to which it is tied by a string；[63] human mind is to immaterial things，as a blind man is to the sun.[64] When the theme refers to the cultivation of virtue，the phoros refers to the planting of vegetables：“First of all one prepares the soil，uproots the weeds，removes the broken shards and stones from the ground，makes the stagnant waters flow into irrigation ditches；only when all this has been done can one plant good seeds.”[65]

The “Western Literate” makes also a polemical use of analogy，especially towards the three major religions which were present in China at the time of Ricci’s stay：Daoism，Buddhism，and Neo-Confucianism. Against the coexistence of various religions，which worship different idols，the same analogy is used as in the argumentation in favour of the oneness of God：“A family can only have one head，it is a crime to have two；a nation can only have one sovereign，it is a crime to have two. The universe，too，can only have one Lord；how can it not be a serious crime to have two？（490）.”[66] Against Daoism and its doctrine of the voidness as the Principle，the analogy between the void Principle as creator of everything and a craftsman as manufacturer of carriages is shown to be inapplicable：“How is it possible that in the beginning the Principle was so ingenious as to create the immensity of heaven and earth，whereas now it has so declined as not to be able to produce even something as small as a carriage？”[67] Against Buddhism，the analogy between the human nature in its present state of decay and a refulgent pearl obscured by filth（which claims the divine nature of the self）is declared patently false：“Unless one was completely sunk in darkness，who would dare say that the origin of the ten thousand beings，the spirit of heaven and earth，has been obscured by things？”[68] Against Neo-Confucianism，the asserted identification of the human self with all things is considered reasonable from an analogical point of view，but inacceptable from a univocal point of view：“There is nothing wrong in the expression ‘to identify oneself with all things’ if it is understood in its figurative sense；but if one uses it in its literal sense，one does no little violence to reason.”[69]

Despite all its charm，however，it must be admitted that the analogic way of thinking lays itself open to harsh criticism. From the points of view of univocal ways of thinking-first of all the analytical mentality，but also the synthetic and dialectical mentalities-it is easy to blame the analogy for being confused：for violating the Aristotelian precept of cognitive and expressive rigour，according to which “not to have one meaning is to have no meaning，and if words have no meaning our reasoning with one another，and indeed with ourselves，has been annihilated；for it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing；but if this is possible，one name might be assigned to this thing. Let it be assumed then［…］that the name has a meaning and has one meaning.”[70]

Otherwise，Aristotle himself admits the necessity of analogical reasoning：“we must not seek a definition of everything but be content to graspthe analogy，that it is as that which is building is to that which is capable of building，and the waking to the sleeping，and that which is seeing to that which has its eyes shut but has sight，and that which has been shaped out of the matter to the matter，and that which has been wrought up to the unwrought；”[71] then，he states clearly that “The causes and the principles of different things are in a sense different，but in a sense，if one speaks universally and analogically，they are the same for all”.[72]

Unfortunately，the balance which existed，in the golden period of Greek philosophy，between the univocal way and theplurivocal way of thinking，definitively broke at the beginning of the Modern Age. From then on，Western man has found it increasingly difficult to think analogically：that is，to take into account simultaneously different aspects of things，in order not to dominate reality，but to contemplate its lofty beauty with awe and gratitude.

Non-Western scholars are exposedto the risk of overestimating the value of the Western disposition to univocal thought，to the point of identifying such disposition with the ultimate “secret of the West”. The key to Western scientific discoveries and economic power. In fact，univocal mentalities（especially analytical and dialectical）have not led the West to the attainment of wisdom，but rather have distorted and diverted the Western quest for truth. Therefore is necessary，for the non-Western student of the West，to realize that the real greatness of the Western culture can only be appreciated through a deep understanding and an intense practice of the analogical mentality；the best example of which is certainly to be found in the work of St.Thomas Aquinas.

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[1] Antonio Olmi，Theological Faculty of Emilia-Romagna professor.

[2] An extreme outcome of this perspective is to be found in the so called “posthumanism”. See Tim Armstrong，Modernism，Technology and the Body：A Cultural Study，Cambridge：Cambridge UP，1998；Cary Wolfe，What is Posthumanism？，Minneapolis：University of Minnesota Press，2010；Rosi Braidotti，The Posthuman，Malden：Polity Press，2013.

[3] This perspective can be referred to as the “classical” Western philosophy.

[4] See Aristotle，Nicomachean Ethics，I，13；Politics，I，2；VⅡ，13.

[5] See Thomas Aquinas，Summa Theologiae，I，16，2；Summa contra Gentiles，I，59；De Veritate，1，1.

[6] Aristotle，Nichomachean Ethics，trans. by D.Ross，I，13；https：//ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/nicomachean/ book1.html（access：2015/08/24）.

[7] Diogenes Laertius，Lives of the Eminent Philosophers，trans. by R.Drew Hicks，VⅡ，1，86；https：//en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VⅡ（access：2015/08/24）.

[8] Marcus Tullius Cicero，On the Laws，trans. by D.Fott，I，30；http：//www.nlnrac.org/classical/cicero/documents/de-legibus（access：2015/08/25）.

[9] Augustine of Hippo，On Order，trans. by S.Borruso，Ⅱ，11，30；https：//www.scribd.com/doc/137067640/Book-Augustine-de-Ordine（access：2015/08/25）.

[10] Augustine of Hippo，On Order，trans. by S.Borruso，Ⅱ，19，50；https：//www.scribd.com/doc/137067640/Book-Augustine-de-Ordine（access：2015/08/25）.

[11] Thomas Aquinas，Summa Theologiae，trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province，Ⅱ-Ⅱ，49，5 ad 3；http：//www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.SS_Q49_A5.html（access：2015/08/25）.

[12] Thomas Aquinas，Summa Theologiae，trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province，I，79，8；http：//www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q79_A8.html（access：2015/08/25）.

[13] Aristotle，Metaphysics，IV，4；http：//classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.4.iv.html（access：2015/08/26）.

[14] Some prominent deniers of common sense were：R.Descartes，D.Hume，I.Kant，G.W.F.Hegel. See Antonio Livi，Filosofia del senso comune. Logica della scienza e della fede，Milano：Edizioni Ares，1990.

[15] See Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange，Le sens commun，la philosophie de l’être et les formules dogmatiques，suivi d’une étude sur la valeur de la critique moderniste des preuves thomistes de l’existence de Dieu，Paris：G.Beauchesne，1909，pp.105-117.

[16] See Antonio Livi，Filosofia del senso comune.

[17] John Paul Ⅱ，encyclical letter Fides et Ratio（1998/09/14），4；http：//w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091998_fides-et-ratio.html（access：2015/08/27）.

[18] See http：//www.philosophyonline.co.uk/oldsite/tok/rationalism7.htm（access 2015/09/25）.

[19] See Antonio Olmi，“L’analogia come concetto analogico，” in F.Bertelè，A.Olmi，A.Salucci，A.Strumia，Scienza，analogia，astrazione：Tommaso d’Aquino e le scienze della complessità，Padova：Ⅱ Poligrafo，1999，p.137.

[20] Marcel Mauss，A General Theory of Magic，trans. by R.Brain，London-New York：Routledge，2001，p.91.

[21] See Antonio Olmi，“L’analogia come concetto analogico，” p.138.

[22] Kim O’Connor，（2003）. Theories of media：Dialectic；http：//csmt.uchicago.edu/glossary2004/dialectic.htm（access：2015/09/16）.

[23] See Antonio Olmi，“L’analogia come concetto analogico，” p.139.

[24] See https：//www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/help/easy.htm（access：2015/09/16）.

[25] See Antonio Olmi，“L’analogia come concetto analogico，” pp.138-139.

[26] See Antonio Olmi，“L’analogia come concetto analogico，” p.65.

[27] “Et iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim in his quae analogice dicuntur，est una ratio，sicut est in univocis；nec totaliter diversa，sicut in aequivocis；sed nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur，significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum；sicut sanum，de urina dictum，significat signum sanitatis animalis，de medicina vero dictum，significat causam eiusdem sanitatis”（Thomas Aquinas，Summa theologiae，I，13，5）.

[28] See Giuseppe Barzaghi，L’essere la ragione la persuasione，Bologna：Edizioni Studio Domenicano，Bologna 1994，p.127.

[29] See Juan José Sanguineti，Logica filosofica，Firenze：Le Monnier 1987，p.57.

[30] See Guido Berghin-Rosè，Elementi di filosofia，Vol.4，Psicologia，Torino：Marietti 1957，pp.246-247.

[31] See Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca，Traité de l’argumentation. La nouvelle rhétorique，Paris：Presses Universitaires de France，1958.

[32] See Petri de Bergomo，In Opera Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Index seu Tabula Aurea，Alba-Roma：Editiones Paulinae，1960，p.79.

[33] See Antonio Olmi，“L’analogia come concetto analogico，” p.75.

[34] See Giuseppe Barzaghi，L’essere la ragione la persuasione，p.126.

[35] Thomas Aquinas，Summa Theologiae，I，13，5；http：//www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q13_A5.html（access：2015/09/26）.

[36] Thomas Aquinas，Summa Theologiae，I，13，5；http：//www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q13_A5.html（access：2015/09/26）.

[37] Thomas Aquinas，Summa Theologiae，I，13，5；http：//www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q13_A5.html（access：2015/09/26）.

[38] Thomas Aquinas，Summa Theologiae，I，13，5；http：//www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q13_A5.html（access：2015/09/26）.

[39] Thomas Aquinas，Summa Theologiae，I，13，5；http：//www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q13_A5.html（access：2015/09/26）.

[40] Thomas Aquinas，Summa Theologiae，I，13，5；http：//www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q13_A5.html（access：2015/09/26）.

[41] Thomas Aquinas，Summa Theologiae，I，13，5；http：//www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q13_A5.html（access：2015/09/26）.

[42] Thomas Aquinas，Summa Theologiae，I，13，5；http：//www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q13_A5.html（access：2015/09/26）.

[43] Battista Mondin，“Partecipazione”，in Dizionario enciclopedico del pensiero di san Tommaso d’Aquino，Bologna：Edizioni Studio Domenicano，1991，p.438.

[44] Thomas Aquinas，Exposition of Boethius’s “Hebdomads”，trans. by P.King，2，24；http：//thegreatthinkers.org/aquinas/other-works/commentary-on-boethiuss-book-de-hebdomadibus（access：2015/09/21）.

[45] See Antonio Olmi，“La struttura del mistero di Dio，” Sacra Doctrina 53（2008）4，pp.313-346.

[46] Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo”，Bologna：Edizioni Studio Domenicano，2013.

[47] See Antonio Olmi，“La teologia del Catechismo ricciano，” in Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” pp.51-88.

[48] See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.3.

[49] “譬如铜铸小球，日月星宿山海万物备焉”；See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.34.

[50] See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.30.

[51] See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.35.

[52] See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.50.

[53] See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.50.

[54] See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.328.

[55] See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.10.

[56] See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.124.

[57] See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.127.

[58] See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.363.

[59] See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.259.

[60] See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.259.

[61] See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.27.

[62] See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.167.

[63] See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.150.

[64] See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.9.

[65] “先缮地，拔其野草，除其瓦石，注其泥水于沟壑，而后艺嘉种也”；See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.461.

[66] “一家止有一长，二之则罪；一国惟得一君，二之则罪；乾坤亦特由一主，二之岂非宇宙间重大罪犯乎？”；See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.490.

[67] “何初之神奇能化天地之大，而今之衰蔽不能发一车之小耶？”；See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.87.

[68] “非沦昧之极，孰敢谓万物之原、天地之灵为物沦昧乎哉？”；See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.220.

[69] “体物以譬喻言之，无所伤焉。如以为实言，伤理不浅”；See Matteo Ricci，“Ⅱ vero significato di “Signore del Cielo，” n.250.

[70] Aristotle，Metaphysics，IV，4.

[71] Aristotle，Metaphysics，IX，6；http：//classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.9.ix.html（access：2015/09/23）.

[72] Aristotle，Metaphysics，XⅡ，4；http：//classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.12.xii.html（access：2015/09/23）.