摘要

随着生态系统服务功能有价、生态修复、污染者付费以及可持续发展等生态环境伦理原则和准则在全球范围内向纵深化拓展，人们开始在继续完善现代环境法以更好救济那些以环境为媒介之传统损害的同时，进一步转向思考如何为纯粹的生态损害提供法制化救济。生态损害法律责任规则相较于其他法律制度具有明显的功能优势（如体现道德谴责要求、对受损环境予以直接修复或赔偿，为责任人设定不利负担进而形成“威慑”），成为各国立法者青睐的制度选择。尽管域外立法采纳的生态损害法律责任规则在规范形态上相对一致（“救济权法律关系”——权利人有权要求义务人修复受损环境，或就事故发生前后减损的生态服务功能价值支付金钱赔偿），但各国为生态损害法律责任配置的实施机制却呈现出多样化特征。法律属性是决定生态损害法律责任实施机制的关键因素。如果生态损害法律责任是公法责任，则其实施机制可以是行政机制，也可以是司法机制；如果生态损害法律责任是私法责任，则其实施机制只能是司法机制。对于中国而言，以公私法二元论为出发点，无论从规范目标还是从功能面向出发展开论证，生态损害法律责任的法律属性均宜定性为公法责任。这也就意味着，生态损害法律责任公法属性决定了其实施机制既可以是行政机制，也可以是司法机制。

行政机制和司法机制的主要差异在于何者享有救济权法律关系的启动权（或者说有关生态损害法律责任问题的首次判断权）。具言之，行政机制在生态损害发生后形成的救济权法律关系是由行政机关根据公法体系中的授权规范，通过自行收集或来自其他渠道的信息，启动的政府公权力主导的法律责任规则实施程序。它因循的是“法律的公共实施理论”，旨在确立一种以行政权为主导的责任实施机制。行政机关作为生态损害救济的首次判断主体。针对行政机关作出的失灵、违法判断，才由具有谦抑权的司法机关进行司法控制。而司法机制的基本原理是运用民事诉讼机制来启动、实施生态损害法律责任规则，故司法机制在生态损害发生后所形成之救济权法律关系的启动权是依据私法规范确立的请求权规则。司法机制因依托于司法程序而呈现出一种司法控制特征，这也决定了其是以诉讼和司法裁判作为核心要素的司法权主导模式——有关法律责任的承担主体、成立要件之满足和具体责任承担方式均由司法机关作首次判断。

中国作为典型的后发型发展中国家，为因应生态损害救济法制建设的全球化趋势，回应国内日益频发之生态损害问题的现实国情，以及人民群众对于良好生态环境日益增长的生活需求，适时开启了生态损害救济立法进程。在生态损害法律责任实施机制的选择问题上，中国立法者针对不同生态损害类型确立了“双轨制”模式。一方面，在土壤污染/损害领域，确立了一种融合行政、司法机制的混合模式；另一方面，在其他生态损害领域，适用司法机制。如此制度设计是否具有正当性，以及未来中国立法者应当如何修正、完善既有规则，均需要从理论层面进行分析、论证。由此，本书旨在研究和回答的问题焦点便是在行政机制和司法机制之中，何者是生态损害法律责任的最佳实施机制。运用法经济学的分析方法，本书假定两种机制的制度效益相同，故关键问题便转化为对两种实施机制的制度成本进行比较。通过理论分析和现实考察，本书得出结论：两种生态损害法律责任实施机制的功能优劣具有相对性和不确定性，对二者的选择实际上是在两种不完善工具间的选择。该结论亦可以从域外各国立法关于实施机制的多样化选择（多杂糅两种机制）中得到印证。在前文基础上，本书试图尝试回答未来中国该如何选择生态损害法律责任的实施机制。制度的设计或选择并不是在一张白纸上绘画，它需要以一国已经确立或者形成的法制传统为基础。因此，鉴于中国已在土壤损害和其他生态损害领域确立了一种“双轨制”的制度安排，未来法律改革应着重修补这种“双轨制”。

关键词：生态损害；法律责任；生态公共利益；行政机制；司法机制

Abstract

With the development of some ecological ethical principles and guidelines such as the value of ecosystem services, the concept of ecological restoration, the polluter pays principle, the payment of ecosystem services and sustainable development goals in the global scope, people began to improve modern environmental law to provide legal remedies for pure ecological damage, while better remedy the traditional damage caused by the environment as a medium.Compared with other legal system tools, legal liability rules have leading functional advantages, such as embodying the requirement of moral condemnation, directly achieving the goal of repairing or compensating damaged environment, and imposing additional unfavorable burden and behavioral deterrence on liable persons.Therefore, legislators in various countries generally choose the legal liability rules for remedying ecological damage（i.e.EDLLR）.Although the EDLLR adopted by extraterritorial legislation are relatively consistent in the normative forms（“legal relationship formed by relief right”-the right holder has the right to require the obligor to repair the damaged environment, or pay monetary compensation for reduced value of the degraded ecological services）, but the liability implementation mechanism（or combination）actually selected by each country shows diversified characteristics.Legal nature is the key factor that determine the implementation mechanism of ecological damage legal liability.If the EDLLR is a public law liability, its implementation mechanism can be an administrative mechanism or a judicial mechanism;if it is a private law liability, its implementation mechanism can only be a judicial mechanism.For China, taking the dualism of public and private law as the starting point, no matter from the normative goal or from the functional perspective, the EDLLR should be a kind of public law liability.This means that the implementation mechanism for EDLLR can be either an administrative mechanism or a judicial mechanism.

In general, the main difference between the two kinds of implementation meachnisms is mainly reflected in the right to form the legal relationship（or the right to first make decisions on the questions related to the EDLLR）.Specificly speaking, the legal basis for the right to initiate the kind of legal relationship under the administrative mechanism is authorization norms in public law, i.e.administrative organs can collect any necessary information and use the public administrative power to enforce the EDLLR.Meanwhile, only the judicial control power can be carried out when there are failures or illegality of exercising administrative power.While the basic principle of the judicial mechanism is to use the civil enforcement mechanism to enforce the EDLLR, so the right to start the legal relationship after the occurrence of ecological damage under the judicial mechanism is the claim right established by private law.The judicial mechanism presents a characteristic of judicial control due to its reliance on civil judicial procedures, which also determines that it is a judicial power-led model with private litigation and judicial judgment as the core element.In other words, the judicial power does have the right to decide the questions related to the EDLLR firstly.

As a typical late-developing country, China has initiated legislation process of remedying ecological damage in response to the global trend in terms of remedying ecological damage, in combination with the reality of the increasingly frequent ecological damage problems in China, and the people's growing demands for a good ecological environment.On the issue of the EDLLR, Chinese legislators have established a“dual-track model”for different types of ecological damage.On the one hand, in the field of soil pollution or land damage, a mixed model integrating administrative and judicial mechanisms has been established.On the other hand, in other areas of ecological damage, the judicial mechanism is applicable.Is such a system design legitimate, and how should Chinese legislators revise and perfect existing rules in the future?All need to be analyzed and demonstrated from the theoretical level.Therefore, this book aims to research and answer which is the best implementation mechanism for EDLLR between administrative mechanism and judicial mechanism.Using the analysis method of law and economics, this book assumes that the implementation benefits of the two mechanisms are the same, so the key question is transformed into a comparison of the implementation costs of the two implementation mechanisms.Through theoretical analysis and practical investigation, this book draws the conclusion that the function of two implementation mechanisms for EDLLR is relative and uncertain, and the choice of them is actually a choice between two imperfect tools.This conclusion can also be confirmed by the diversified choices in other countries' legislation, there are always a mixture of two mechanisms.Finally, this book attempts to answer how China should choose between administrative mechanism and judicial mechanism for EDLLR? As system design is not drawing on a piece of white paper, legislators need to consider carefully about their established legal tradition and reality.Therefore, in the last chapter, given that China has established a“dual track system”for EDLLR, future legal reforms therefore should focus on repairing this“dual track system”.

Key Words:Ecological Damage; Legal Liability Rules; Ecologial Public Interest;Administrative Meachnism;Judicial Meachnism