5. A Review of Viewpoints on China-CEEC Cooperation and Its Influence on China-EU Relations_中国—中东欧国家合作进展与评估报告（2012-2020）-QQ阅读男生科幻网

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5. A Review of Viewpoints on China-CEEC Cooperation and Its Influence on China-EU Relations

There has always been doubts and misgivings about China-CEEC Cooperation inside the EU, and the major viewpoints are as follows:

First, “split and rule”. Since the establishment of China-CEEC Cooperation, the EU has been suspicious of the intention of the format to split the EU, describing the format as a Trojan Horse sent to Europe by China. Such suspicion has always been there. In March 2019, the European Commission released a paper entitled EU-China: A Strategic Outlook, where China was called a systemic rival of the EU. This is echoed by some European scholars who are of the view that the EU realized that China-CEEC Cooperation may further erode the European values and uniformity and result in division of the EU.^[17] In recent years, hit by the migration crisis, populism and Brexit, the EU has become more sensitive to changes in its external environment and it has become imperative that the EU maintain internal solidarity and mitigate risks of instability. Chinese efforts to deepen cooperation with CEECs at this juncture are easily understood by some in the EU as negative.

Second, “rule breaker”. The EU attaches great importance to rules and standards and prides itself on being a normative power or rule-based actor. As China grows stronger, the EU sees China as a rival when it makes rules, especially after China proposed the Belt and Road initiative. Some EU member states pay close attention to the increase of Chinese investment in Europe via the Belt and Road platform and keep stressing the importance of compliance with rules and standards when the Belt and Road initiative is being implemented. European think tanks criticize some of the Chinese-invested projects in CEECs for not complying with rules, such as the Budapest-Belgrade Railway (Hungarian section) and highway projects in North Macedonia. Other projects are criticized for adding to the debt risks of CEECs, such as the Smokovac-Meteševo Highway in Montenegro, and the Stanari Thermal Power Plant in Bosnia and Herzegovina is disputed to be not environment-friendly. These projects are labelled as negative investment projects for alleged non-compliance with EU regulations.

Third, “geopolitical motives”. Worried about potential geographical and economic implications brought by China-CEEC Cooperation, the EU is concerned that China may gradually take control in major European infrastructure through its investment projects, which will result in closer relations with CEECs and more leverage in pressurizing the EU and major EU member states. There are also fears that China may take advantage of the geopolitical and economic influence that it is gradually developing in CEECs to block some of EU’s common policy towards China. Meanwhile, some CEECs may make use of their strong relationship with China to bargain with the EU.

In the face of doubts and misunderstanding of one kind or another, China has been responding through constant dialogue and communication with the EU. It argues that on the one hand, China-CEEC Cooperation is not directed against any other country or organization, and it is merely developing normal state-to-state relations. On the other hand, China will not view its relations with CEECs in isolation from the larger picture of China-EU relations. On the contrary, it sees China-CEEC Cooperation as an important part of China-EU relations.

China-CEEC Cooperation is a cooperation platform jointed built by China and CEECs that aims to promote growth in both China and CEECs and contribute to European integration. China has no geopolitical intentions behind its cooperation with CEECs and firmly supports European integration. The EU is an important force for world peace and stability and the largest trading partner of China. A united, stable and prosperous EU is in the fundamental interest of China. China-CEEC Cooperation has never been conducted in disregard of the larger picture of China-EU cooperation. It will not only inject positive energy into the European integration process, but also help China-EU relations develop in a more balanced manner. Just like proposals such as a multi-speed Europe or reshaping Europe, China-CEEC Cooperation is also committed to more balanced and thorough development of the European economy and ultimately European integration. China-CEEC Cooperation has always abided by internationally recognized rules, including WTO rules, respected EU legislation and regulations, stayed committed to consultation and sharing benefits and urged businesses to follow market and business rules when they bid for European projects without making any exclusive arrangements. It has proven to be an open, transparent and inclusive cooperation platform that injects impetus to China-CEEC relations and contributes additional highlights to China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership.

[1] When China-CEEC Cooperation was created, 16 CEECs joined, so the format was also called 16+1 Cooperation.When Greece joined in April 2019, the format was expanded to become 17+1 Cooperation. So China-CEEC documents published before 2019 often referred to the format as 16+1 Cooperation.

[2] The Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, 26 November 2013, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-11/26/content_2535458.htm.

[3] Premier Li Keqiang Attends China-CEEC Summit, 26 November 2013, http://china.cnr.cn/news/201311/t20131126_514243876.shtml.

[4] The Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, 17 December 2014, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-12/17/c_1113667695.htm.

[5] The Medium-Term Agenda for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, 25 November 2015, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-11/25/c_128464366.htm.

[6] The Riga Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, 27 November 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-11/06/c_1119859319.htm.

[7] The Budapest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, 1 December 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2017-12/01/c_1122039253.htm.

[8] The Sofia Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, 9 July 2018, http://world.people.com.cn/gb/n1/2018/0709/c1002-30134060.html.

[9] The Dubrovnik Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, 13 April 2019, http://ozs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/hzcg/201904/20190402854103.shtml.

[10] China’s Policy Paper on the European Union, 18 December 2018, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-12/18/content_5349904.htm.

[11] Based in Cangzhou City of Hebei Province of China.

[12] Statistics of Trade between China and European Countries from January to December 2019, 2 March 2020, Website of Mofcom, http://ozs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zojmgx/date/202003/20200302941074.shtml.

[13] Report Shows a Surge in the Number of Chinese Tourists Visiting CEECs in the First Half of This Year, 22 August 2019, http://news.xinhua08.com/a/20190822/1885136.shtml.

[14] Calculated based on the Statistical Communiqué of China’s Foreign Direct Investment in 2018 by the Ministry of Commerce, National Bureau of Statistics and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange of China (2019 edition, China Statistics Press).

[15] Connected by the Land-Sea Express Line, China and the EU Jointly Build Maritime Silk Road, 9 May 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2017-05/09/c_136267884.htm.

[16] The Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of China-Germany Inter-governmental Consultations,13 June 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-06/13/c_1119035292.htm.

[17] “Will China’s ‘16+1’ Format Divide Europe?”, http://www.csis.org/analysis/will-chinas-161-format-divide-europe.