第90章 BENTHAM'S DOCTRINE(12)

The universe of thought is made up of a number of separate 'entities'corresponding to nouns-substantive,and when these bundles are distinctly isolated by appropriate nouns,the process of arranging and codifying according to the simple relations indicated by the copula is greatly facilitated.The ideal language would resemble algebra,in which symbols,each representing a given numerical value,are connected by the smallest possible number of symbols of operation,+,-,=,and so forth.To set two such statements side by side,or to modify them by inserting different constants,is then a comparatively easy process,capable of being regulated by simple general rules.Bentham's style becomes tiresome,and was often improperly called obscure.It requires attention,but the meaning is never doubtful --and to the end we have frequent flashes of the old vivacity.

The Rationale of Evidence,as Mill remarks,(63)is 'one of the richest in matter of all Bentham's productions.'It contains,too,many passages in Bentham's earlier style,judiciously preserved by his young editor;indeed,so many that I am tempted even to call the book amusing.In spite of the wearisome effort to say everything,and to force language into the mould presented by his theory,Bentham attracts us by his obvious sincerity.The arguments may be unsatisfactory,but they are genuine arguments.They represent cOnviction;they are given because they have convinced;and no reader can deny that they really tend to convince.We may complain that there are too many words,and that the sentences are cumbrous;but the substance is always to the point.The main purpose may be very briefly indicated.Bentham begins by general considerations upon evidence,in which he and his youthful editor indicate their general adherence to the doctrines of Hume.(64)This leads to an application of the methods expounded in the 'Introduction,'in order to show how the various motives or 'springs of action'and the 'sanctions'based upon them may affect the trustworthiness of evidence.Any motive whatever may incidentally cause 'mendacity.'The second book,therefore,considers what securities may be taken for 'securing trustworthiness.'We have,for example,a discussion of the value of oaths (he thinks them valueless),of the advantages and disadvantages of reducing evidence to writing,of interrogating witnesses,and of the publicity or privacy of evidence.Book III deals with the 'extraction of evidence.'We have to compare the relative advantages of oral and written evidence,the rules for cross-examining witnesses and for taking evidence as to their character.Book IV deals with 'pre-appointed evidence,'the cases,that is,in which events are recorded at the time of occurrenCe with a view to their subsequent use as evidence.We have under this head to consider the formalities which should be required in regard to contracts and wills;and the mode of recording judicial and other official decisions and registering births,deaths,and marriages.In Books V and VIwe consider two kinds of evidence which is in one way or other of inferior cogency,namely,'circumstantial evidence,'in which the evidence if accepted still leaves room for a process of more or less doubtful inference;and 'makeshift evidence,'such evidence as must sometimes be accepted for want of the best,of which the most conspicuous instance is 'hearsay evidence.'Book VII deals with the 'authentication'of evidence.Book viii is a consideration of the 'technical'system,that namely which was accepted by English lawyers;and finally Book IX deals with a special point,namely,the exclusion of evidence.

Bentham announces at starting(65)that he shall establish 'one theorem'and consider two problems.The problems are:'what securities can be taken for the truth of evidence?'and 'what rules can be given for estimating the value of evidence?'The 'theorem'is that no evidence should be excluded with the professed intention of obtaining a right decision;though some must be excluded to avoid expense,vexation,and delay.This,therefore,as his most distinct moral,is fully treated in the last book.

Had Bentham confined himself to a pithy statement of his leading doctrines,and confirmed them by a few typical cases,he would have been more effective in a literary sense.His passion for 'codification,'for tabulating and arranging facts in all their complexity,and for applying his doctrine at full length to every case that he can imagine,makes him terribly prolix.On the other hand,this process no doubt strengthened his own conviction and the conviction of his disciples as to the value of his process.Follow this clue of utility throughout the whole labyrinth,see what a clear answer it offers at every point,and you cannot doubt that you are in possession of the true compass for such a navigation.Indeed,it seems to be indisputable that Bentham's arguments are the really relevant and important arguments.How can we decide any of the points which come up for discussion?Should a witness be cross examined?Should his evidence be recorded?Should a wife be allowed to give evidence against her husband?or the defendant to give evidence about his own case?These and innumerable other points can only be decided by reference to what Bentham understood by 'utility.'This or that arrangement is 'useful'because it enables us to get quickly and easily at the evidence,to take effective securities for its truthfulness,to estimate its relevance and importance,to leave the decision to the most qualified persons,and so forth.

These points,again,can only be decided by a careful appeal to experience,and by endeavouring to understand the ordinary play of 'motives'and 'sanctions.'