第29章

III. The third seditious doctrine springs from the same root, That Tyrannicide is lawfull; Nay, at this day it is by many Divines, and of old it was by all the Philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and the rest of the maintainers of the Greek, and Roman Anarchies, held not only lawful, but even worthy of the greatest praise. And under the title of Tyrants, they mean not onely Monarchs, but all those who bear the chief rule in any Government whatsoever; for not Pisistratus onely at Athens, but those thirty also who succeeded him, and ruled together, were all called Tyrants. But he, whom men require to be put to death as being a Tyrant, commands either by Right, or without Right; if without Right, he is an enemy, and by Right to be put to death; but then this must not be called the killing a Tyrant, but an enemy: if by Right, then the divine interrogation takes place, Who hath told thee that he was a Tyrant, hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat? For why doest thou call him a Tyrant, whom God hath made a King, except that thou being a private Person, usurpest to thy self the knowledge of good and evill? But how pernicious this opinion is to all governments, but especially to that which is Monarchicall, we may hence discerne, namely, that by it every King, whether good or ill, stands exposed to be condemned by the judgement, and slain by the hand of every murtherous villain.

IV. The fourth adversary opinion to Civill Society, is theirs, who hold, That they who bear Rule are Subject also to the Civill Lawes. Which hath been sufficiently proved before not to be true in the 6. Chap. Artic. 14. from this Argument, That a City can neither be bound to it self, nor to any subject; not to it selfe, because no man can be obliged except it be to another; not to any Subject, because the single wills of the Subjects are contained in the will of the City, insomuch, that if the City will be free from all such obligation, the Subjects will so too; and by consequence she is so. But that which holds true in a City, that must be supposed to be true in a man, or an assembly of men, who have the Supreme Authority, for they make a City, which hath no being but by their Supreme Power. Now that this Opinion cannot consist with the very being of Government, is evident from hence, that by it the knowledge of what is Good and Evill, that is to say, the definition of what is, and what is not against the Lawes, would return to each single Person: Obedience therefore will cease as oft as any thing seemes to be commanded contrary to the Civill Lawes, and together with it, all coercive jurisdiction, which cannot possibly be without the destruction of the very essence of Government. Yet this Errour hath great props, Aristotle, and others; who, by reason of humane infirmity, suppose the Supreme Power to be committed with most security to the Lawes onely; but they seem to have lookt very shallowly into the nature of, Government, who thought that the constraining Power, the interpretation of Lawes, and the making of Lawes, (all which are powers necessarily belonging to Government) should be left wholly to the Lawes themselves. Now although particular Subjects may sometimes contend in judgement, and goe to Law with the Supreme Magistrate, yet this is onely then, when the question is not what the Magistrate may, but what by a certain Rule he hath declared he would doe. As, when by any Law the Judges sit upon the life of a Subject, the question is not whether the Magistrate could by his absolute Right deprive him of his life; but whether by that Law his will was that he should be deprived of it; but his will was, he should, if he brake the Law. else, his will was he should not: This therefore, that a Subject may have an action of Law against his Supreme Magistrate, is not strength of Argument sufficient to prove that he is tyed to his own Lawes. On the contrary, it is evident, that he is not tied to his owne Lawes, because no man is bound to himself. Lawes therefore are set for Titius, and Caius, not for the Ruler: however, by the ambition of Lawyers, it is so ordered, that the Lawes, to unskilfull men seeme not to depend on the Authority of the Magistrate, but their Prudence.

V. In the fifth place, That the Supreme Authority may be divided, is a most fatall Opinion to all Common-weales. But diverse men divide it diverse wayes. For some divide it so as to grant a Supremacy to the Civill Power in matters pertaining to Peace, and the benefits of this life, but in things concerning the salvation of the Soul they transfer it on others. Now, because justice is of all things most necessary to Salvation, it happens, that Subjects measuring justice, not as they ought, by the Civill Lawes, but by the precepts and doctrines of them who, in regard of the Magistrate, are either private mens or strangers, through a superstitious fear dare not perform the obedience due to their Princes, through fear falling into that which they most feared: Now what can be more pernicious to any state, then that men should, by the apprehension of everlasting torments, be deterred from obeying their Princes, that is to say, the Lawes, or from being just? There are also some who divide the Supreme Authority so as to allow the power of War, and Peace, unto one, (whom they call a Monarch) but the right of raising Monies they give to some others, and not to him: But because monies are the sinewes of War, and Peace, they who thus divide the Authority, doe either really not divide it at all, but place it wholly in them, in whose power the money is, but give the name of it to another, or if they doe really divide it, they dissolve the Government: for neither upon necessity can War be waged, nor can the publique Peace be preserved without Money.