第51章

It may be asked， perhaps， what has so long kept this disjointed machine from falling entirely to pieces？ The answer is obvious： The weakness of most of the members， who are unwilling to expose themselves to the mercy of foreign powers； the weakness of most of the principal members， compared with the formidable powers all around them； the vast weight and influence which the emperor derives from his separate and heriditary dominions； and the interest he feels in preserving a system with which his family pride is connected， and which constitutes him the first prince in Europe； -- these causes support a feeble and precarious Union； whilst the repellant quality， incident to the nature of sovereignty， and which time continually strengthens， prevents any reform whatever， founded on a proper consolidation. Nor is it to be imagined， if this obstacle could be surmounted， that the neighboring powers would suffer a revolution to take place which would give to the empire the force and preeminence to which it is entitled. Foreign nations have long considered themselves as interested in the changes made by events in this constitution； and have， on various occasions， betrayed their policy of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness.

If more direct examples were wanting， Poland， as a government over local sovereigns， might not improperly be taken notice of. Nor could any proof more striking be given of the calamities flowing from such institutions.

Equally unfit for self-government and self-defense， it has long been at the mercy of its powerful neighbors； who have lately had the mercy to disburden it of one third of its people and territories.

The connection among the Swiss cantons scarcely amounts to a confederacy； though it is sometimes cited as an instance of the stability of such institutions.

They have no common treasury； no common troops even in war； no common coin； no common judicatory； nor any other common mark of sovereignty.

They are kept together by the peculiarity of their topographical position； by their individual weakness and insignificancy； by the fear of powerful neighbors， to one of which they were formerly subject； by the few sources of contention among a people of such simple and homogeneous manners； by their joint interest in their dependent possessions； by the mutual aid they stand in need of， for suppressing insurrections and rebellions， an aid expressly stipulated and often required and afforded； and by the necessity of some regular and permanent provision for accomodating disputes among the cantons. The provision is， that the parties at variance shall each choose four judges out of the neutral cantons， who， in case of disagreement， choose an umpire. This tribunal， under an oath of impartiality， pronounces definitive sentence， which all the cantons are bound to enforce. The competency of this regulation may be estimated by a clause in their treaty of 1683， with Victor Amadeus of Savoy； in which he obliges himself to interpose as mediator in disputes between the cantons， and to employ force， if necessary， against the contumacious party.

So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of comparison with that of the United States， it serves to confirm the principle intended to be established. Whatever efficacy the union may have had in ordinary cases， it appears that the moment a cause of difference sprang up， capable of trying its strength， it failed. The controversies on the subject of religion， which in three instances have kindled violent and bloody contests， may be said， in fact， to have severed the league. The Protestant and Catholic cantons have since had their separate diets， where all the most important concerns are adjusted， and which have left the general diet little other business than to take care of the common bailages.

That separation had another consequence， which merits attention. It produced opposite alliances with foreign powers： of Berne， at the head of the Protestant association， with the United Provinces； and of Luzerne， at the head of the Catholic association， with France.

PUBLIUS

1. Pfeffel， "Nouvel Abr間. Chronol. de l'Hist.， etc.， d'Allemagne，" says the pretext was to indemnify himself for the expense of the expedition.

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