第56章 Letter XIV(1)

Sir,The defects,which I have presumed to censure in the Roman constitution of government,were avoided in some of those that were established on the breaking of that empire,by the northern nations and the Goths;for I suspect that the Goths were not properly and strictly a northern nation,any more than the Huns and the Alans,though they have been often confounded,and I believe by myself.Let us cast our eyes on Spain and France.

We cannot arrive,as far as my scanty knowledge informs me,at any particular and authentic account of the scheme of that government which the western Goths established,when,driven out of Gaul by the Franks,they drove the Vandals and the Alans out of Spain;nor distinguish very accurately between such institutions as were parts of the original Gothic plan,and such as were introduced into the several kingdoms that formed themselves on the reconquest of the country by the Spaniards from the Arabs and Moors.The original of the Cortes particularly is quite in the dark,as we are assured by a very industrious enquirer and judicious writer.Thus much,however,we may assert,that the Gothic kings were at first elective,and always limited,even after they became hereditary;and that the Cortes,whenever it was established,was an assembly,that may be more truly compared to a British Parliament than the assembly of the states of France could ever pretend to be.Churchmen had wriggled themselves into a share of temporal power among the Goths,as they did in every country where they were admitted to preach the gospel,though without any authority from the gospel;so that the Cortes consisted of prelates,as well as dukes,masters of orders,earls and ricoshomes,who composed the whole body of the nobility;and of the procurators of the commons;that is,of the citizens and burgesses,chosen by the cities and boroughs to represent and act for the whole body of the commons.To preserve the independency of this assembly,these procurators were to be paid by the corporations for which they served;the king was to give no office of salary to any of them;nay,a 'resumption of rewards,granted to members of the Cortes'was once at least debated,if not enacted.In short,he was not to name their president,nor even to send letters unopened to any of them.No money could be raised on the subjects,without the consent of this assembly;and it was a standing maxim,or order,that redress of grievances should precede the grants of supplies.Such a frame of government as this seems built to duration;and,in fact,if it had not been undermined,it could not have been demolished.

The manner in which it was both undermined and demolished totally at last,deserves the attention of every man in Britain.It was undermined by the influence of the court,too much connived at and too long tolerated,on the members of the Cortes.Prostitute wretches were found in those days,I doubt not,as well as in ours,to maintain that the necessary independency of the prince could not be supported,without allowing a corrupt dependency of the Cortes on him;and they had in those days such success in Castile,as we ought to hope they will never obtain in Britain.When corrupt majorities were thus secured,pretences were not wanting,nor will they ever be so,for making concessions to the crown,repugnant to the spirit of the constitution,and even inconsistent with the forms of it.Such pretences,however plausible,would not have been admitted by men zealous to preserve their liberty;because any real danger,remote as well as immediate,to a free constitution,would in their balance outweigh all considerations of real expediency,and much more all the frivolous pretences of that kind.But the members of the Cortes were no longer such men,when Castile lost her liberties under Charles the Fifth.The custom of bribing the representatives of the commons,by gifts and promises,and so securing a majority to the court,had long prevailed,as we have just now said;and after that,it is not to be wondered at if excises,given for eight years only,became perpetual;if money was granted before grievances were redressed;and if the precedent set in the time of Henry the Second,was followed in all succeeding reigns.The Cortes gave this prince a supply,for making war on the Moors;but the sum being represented by the court to be insufficient for the service,it was carried that,in case of a deficiency,the king might raise,without calling a Cortes,the money necessary to make good that deficiency.This vote of credit gave an incurable fatal wound to that constitution.I call it a vote of credit,though the powers it gave seem to be less than those which are given by some modern votes of credit;for surely there is a difference,and not a small one,between a power to raise money directly on the people,for a service known,and already approved,and provided for in part,by their representatives,and a power to borrow money,on the national credit,for services unknown,and to lay the nation under an obligation of paving for that which it is possible their representatives may disapprove.