第43章 Letter XI(3)

This is the present state,sufficiently known,but necessary to be mentioned particularly on this occasion:and this must continue to be the state,unless some prince should arise hereafter,who,being advised by a desperate minister,abetted by a mercenary faction,supported by a standing army,and instigated,like Richard the Second,by the 'rashness of his own temper',may lay rapacious hands on all the funds that have been created,and by applying illegally what he may raise legally,convert the whole to his own use,and so establish arbitrary power,by depriving at one stroke many of his subjects of their property,and all of them of their liberty.Till this happens (and heaven forbid that it should be ever attempted)sessions of Parliament must be annually held,or the government itself be distressed.But neither is this such a direct and full security as the importance of the thing requires;nor does the security of our liberty consist only in frequent sessions of Parliaments,but it consists 1ikewise in frequent new Parliaments.Nay,it consists so much more in this than in the other,that the former may tend without the latter,even more than the discontinuance of Parliaments,to the loss of liberty.This was foreseen by the wisdom of our constitution.According to that,although it became in time,by the course of events,and insensible alterations,no longer necessary to call Parliaments once,or even twice in a year,which had been the more ancient practice,yet still our kings continued under an incapacity of proceeding long in government,with any tolerable ease and safety to themselves,without the concurrence and assistance of these assemblies.According to the same constitution,as Parliaments were to be held,so they were to be chosen frequently;and the opinion,that the 'holding and continuance of Parliaments depended absolutely on the will of the prince',may be justly ranked amongst those attempts,that were made by some men to set the law,whilst others endeavoured to set the gospel,on the side of arbitrary power.This is the plain intent and scheme of our constitution,which provides that the representatives of the people should have frequent opportunities to communicate together about national grievances;to complain of them,and to obtain the redress of them,in an orderly,solemn,legal manner;and that the people should have frequent opportunities of calling their representatives to account,as it were,for the discharge of the trust committed to them,and of approving or disapproving their conduct,by electing or not electing them anew.Thus our constitution supposes that princes may abuse their power,and Parliaments betray their trust;and provides,as far as human wisdom can provide,that neither one nor the other may be able to do so long,without a sufficient control.If the crown,indeed,persists in usurping on the liberty of the people,or in any other kind of maladministration;and if the prince who wears it proves deaf,as our princes have sometimes been,to the voice of his Parliament and his people,there remains no remedy in the system of the constitution.The constitution is broken by the obstinacy of the prince,and the 'people must appeal to heaven in this,as in all other cases,where they have no judge on earth'.Thus if a Parliament should persist in abetting maladministration,or any way give up those liberties which they were entrusted to maintain,no doubt can be made but that the people would be in the same case;since their representatives have no more right to betray them,than their kings have to usurp upon them:and by consequence they would acquire the same right of appealing to heaven,if our constitution had not provided a remedy against this evil,which could not be provided against the other;but our constitution hath provided such a remedy in the frequent succession of new Parliaments,by which there is not time sufficient given,to form a majority of the representatives of the people into a ministerial cabal;or by which,if this should happen,such a cabal must be soon broken.

These reflections,and such others as they naturally suggest,are sufficient to convince any thinking man,first,that nothing could make it safe,nor therefore reasonable,to repose in any set of men whatsoever,so great a trust as the collective body delegates to the representative in this kingdom,except the shortness of the term for which this trust is delegated.Secondly,that every prolongation of this term is therefore,in its degree,unsafe for the people;that it weakens their security,and endangers liberty by the very powers given for its preservation.Thirdly,that such prolongations expose the nation,in the possible case of having a corrupt Parliament,to lose the great advantage which our constitution hath provided,of curing the evil,before it grows confirmed and desperate,by the gentle method of choosing a new representative,and reduce the nation,by consequence,to have no other alternative than that of submitting or resisting;though submission will be as grievous,and resistance much more difficult,when the legislature betrays its trust,than when the king alone abuses his power.--These reflections,I say,are sufficient to prove these propositions;and these propositions set before us,in a very strong light,the necessity of using our utmost efforts that the true design of our constitution may be pursued as closely as possible,by the reestablishment of annual,or at least of triennial Parliaments.

But the importance of the matter,and the particular seasonableness of the conjuncture,invite me to offer one consideration more upon this head,which I think will not strike the less for being obvious and plain.It is this.