第46章 Chapter 7(4)

They, that is to say the Irish by sentiment rather than by domicile, the Irish people as contrasted with the vested interests of Ulster, of the landlords, of the Church, and of the bureaucracy,these Irish have long been a nationality and are now mobilising all their force to set up a Balkan state, autonomous and defensible, within the formal bounds of the Empire or without. Their case is peculiar and instructive. It throws a light on the margin of tolerance, of what the traffic will bear, beyond which an increased pressure on a subject population will bring no added profit to the vested interests for whose benefit the pressure is brought to bear. It is a case of the Common Man hard ridden in due legal form by the vested interests of the Island, and of the neighboring island, which are duly backed by an alien and biased bureaucracy aided and abetted by the priestly pickpockets of the poor. So caught in this way between the devil and the deep sea, it is small wonder if they have chosen in the end to follow counsels of desperation and are moving to throw their lot into the deep sea of national self-help and international intrigue. They have reached the point where they have ceased to say: "It might have been worse." The case of the Finns, Jews, and Armenians is not greatly different in general effect.

It is easy to fall into a state of perturbation about the evil case of the submerged, exploited, and oppressed minor nationalities; and it is not unusual to jump to the conclusion that national self-determination will surely mend their evil case. National self-determination and national integrity are words to conjure with, and there is no denying that very substantial results have been known to follow from such conjuring. But self-determination is not a sovereign remedy, particularly not as regards the material conditions of life for the common man, for that somewhat more than nine-tenths of the population who always finally have to bear the cost of any national establishment. It has been tried, and the point is left in doubt. So the case of Belgium or of Serbia during the past four years has been scarcely less evil than that of the Armenians or the Poles. Belgium and Serbia were nations, in due form, very much after the pattern aimed at in the new projected nations already spoken of, whereas the Armenians and the Poles have been subject minor nationalities. Belgium. Serbia, and Poland have been subject to the ravages of an imperial power which claims rank as a civilised people, whereas the Armenians have been manhandled by the Turks. So, again, the Irish are a subject minor nationality, whereas the Roumanians are a nation in due form. In fact the Roumanians are just such a balkan state as the Irish aspire to become. But no doubt the common man is appreciably worse off in his material circumstances in Roumania than in Ireland. Japan, too, is not only a self-determining nation with a full charge of national integrity, but it is a Great Power; yet the common man -- the somewhat more than nine-tenths of the population -- is doubtless worse off in point of hard usage and privation in Japan than in Ireland.

In further illustration of this doubt and perplexity with regard to the material value of national self-determination, the case of the three Scandinavian countries may be worth citing.

They are all and several self-determining nations, in that Pickwickian sense in which any country which is not a Great Power may be self-determining in the twentieth century. But they differ in size, population, wealth, power, and political consequence. In these respects the sequence runs: Sweden, Denmark. Norway, the latter being the smallest, poorest, least self-determining, and in point of self-determining nationalism altogether the most spectacularly foolish of the lot. But so far as concerns the material conditions of life for the common man, they are unmistakably the most favorable, or the most nearly tolerable, in Norway, and the least so in Sweden. The upshot of evidence from these, and from other instances that might be cited, is to leave the point in doubt. It is not evident that the common man has anything to gain by national self-determination, so far as regards his material conditions of life; nor does it appear, on the evidence of these instances, that he has much to lose by that means.

These Scandinavians differ from the Balkan states in that they perforce have no imperialistic ambitions. There may of course be a question on this head so far as concerns the frame of mind of the royal establishment in the greater one of the Scandinavian kingdoms; there is not much that is worth saying about that matter, and the less that is said, the less annoyance.

It is a matter of no significance, anyway. The Scandinavians are in effect not imperialistic, perforce. Which means that in their international relations they formally adhere to the rule of Live and Let Live. Not so in their domestic policy, however. They have all endowed themselves with all the encumbrances of national pretensions and discrimination which their circumstances will admit. Apart from a court and church which foot up to nothing more comfortable than a gratuitous bill of expense, they are also content to carry the burden of a national armament, a protective tariff, a national consular service, and a diplomatic service which takes care of a moderately burdensome series of treaty agreements governing the trade relations of the Scandinavian business community; all designed for the benefit of the vested interests and the kept classes of the nation, and all at the cost of the common man.

The case of these relatively free, relatively unassuming, and relatively equitable national establishments is also instructive.