第76章 OF COUNSEL(1)

HOW fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things by the ordinary and inconstant use of words appeareth in nothing more than in the confusion of counsels and commands,arising from the imperative manner of speaking in them both,and in many other occasions besides.For the words do this are the words not only of him that commandeth;but also of him that giveth counsel;and of him that exhorteth;and yet there are but few that see not that these are very different things;or that cannot distinguish between when they when they perceive who it is that speaketh,and to whom the speech is directed,and upon what occasion.But finding those phrases in men's writings,and being not able or not willing to enter into a consideration of the circumstances,they mistake sometimes the precepts of counsellors for the precepts of them that command;and sometimes the contrary;according as it best agreeth with the conclusions they would infer,or the actions they approve.To avoid which mistakes and render to those terms of commanding,counselling,and exhorting,their proper and distinct significations,I define them thus.

Command is where a man saith,"Do this,"or "Do not this,"without expecting other reason than the will of him that says it.From this it followeth manifestly that he that commandeth pretendeth thereby his own benefit:for the reason of his command is his own will only,and the proper object of every man's will is some good to himself.

Counsel is where a man saith,"Do,"or "Do not this,"and deduceth his reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it.And from this it is evident that he that giveth counsel pretendeth only (whatsoever he intendeth)the good of him to whom he giveth it.

Therefore between counsel and command,one great difference is that command is directed to a man's own benefit,and counsel to the benefit of another man.And from this ariseth another difference,that a man may be obliged to do what he is commanded;as when he hath covenanted to obey:but he cannot be obliged to do as he is counselled,because the hurt of not following it is his own;or if he should covenant to follow it,then is the counsel turned into the nature of a command.A third difference between them is that no man can pretend a right to be of another man's counsel;because he is not to pretend benefit by it to himself:but to demand right to counsel another argues a will to know his designs,or to gain some other good to himself;which,as I said before,is of every man's will the proper object.

This also is incident to the nature of counsel;that whatsoever it be,he that asketh it cannot in equity accuse or punish it:for to ask counsel of another is to permit him to give such counsel as he shall think best;and consequently,he that giveth counsel to his sovereign (whether a monarch or an assembly)when he asketh it,cannot in equity be punished for it,whether the same be conformable to the opinion of the most,or not,so it be to the proposition in debate.

For if the sense of the assembly can be taken notice of,before the debate be ended,they should neither ask nor take any further counsel;for sense of the assembly is the resolution of the debate and end of all deliberation.And generally he that demandeth counsel is author of it,and therefore cannot punish it;and what the sovereign cannot,no man else can.But if one subject giveth counsel to another to do anything contrary to the laws,whether that counsel proceed from evil intention or from ignorance only,it is punishable by the Commonwealth;because ignorance of the law is no good excuse,where every man is bound to take notice of the laws to which he is subject.

Exhortation,and dehortation is counsel,accompanied with signs in him that giveth it of vehement desire to have it followed;or,to say it more briefly,counsel vehemently pressed.For he that exhorteth doth not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done,and tie himself therein to the rigor of true reasoning,but encourages him he counselleth to action:as he that dehorteth deterreth him from it.And therefore they have in their speeches a regard to the common passions and opinions of men,in deducing their reasons;and make use of similitudes,metaphors,examples,and other tools of oratory,to persuade their hearers of the utility,honour,or justice of following their advice.

From whence may be inferred,first,that exhortation and dehortation is directed to the good of him that giveth the counsel,not of him that asketh it,which is contrary to the duty of a counsellor;who,by the definition of counsel,ought to regard,not his own benefit,but his whom he adviseth.And that he directeth his counsel to his own benefit is manifest enough by the long and vehement urging,or by the artificial giving thereof;which being not required of him,and consequently proceeding from his own occasions,is directed principally to his own benefit,and but accidentally to the good of him that is counselled,or not at all.

Secondly,that the use of exhortation and dehortation lieth only where a man is to speak to a multitude,because when the speech is addressed to one,he may interrupt him and examine his reasons more rigorously than can be done in a multitude;which are too many to enter into dispute and dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them all at once.