第55章 OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS BY INSTITUTION(5)

The difference between these three kinds of Commonwealth consisteth,not in the difference of power,but in the difference of convenience or aptitude to produce the peace and security of the people;for which end they were instituted.And to compare monarchy with the other two,we may observe:first,that whosoever beareth the person of the people,or is one of that assembly that bears it,beareth also his own natural person.And though he be careful in his politic person to procure the common interest,yet he is more,or no less,careful to procure the private good of himself,his family,kindred and friends;and for the most part,if the public interest chance to cross the private,he prefers the private:for the passions of men are commonly more potent than their reason.From whence it follows that where the public and private interest are most closely united,there is the public most advanced.Now in monarchy the private interest is the same with the public.The riches,power,and honour of a monarch arise only from the riches,strength,and reputation of his subjects.For no king can be rich,nor glorious,nor secure,whose subjects are either poor,or contemptible,or too weak through want,or dissension,to maintain a war against their enemies;whereas in a democracy,or aristocracy,the public prosperity confers not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt,or ambitious,as doth many times a perfidious advice,a treacherous action,or a civil war.

Secondly,that a monarch receiveth counsel of whom,when,and where he pleaseth;and consequently may hear the opinion of men versed in the matter about which he deliberates,of what rank or quality soever,and as long before the time of action and with as much secrecy as he will.But when a sovereign assembly has need of counsel,none are admitted but such as have a right thereto from the beginning;which for the most part are of those who have been versed more in the acquisition of wealth than of knowledge,and are to give their advice in long discourses which may,and do commonly,excite men to action,but not govern them in it.For the understanding is by the flame of the passions never enlightened,but dazzled:nor is there any place or time wherein an assembly can receive counsel secrecy,because of their own multitude.

Thirdly,that the resolutions of a monarch are subject to no other inconstancy than that of human nature;but in assemblies,besides that of nature,there ariseth an inconstancy from the number.For the absence of a few that would have the resolution,once taken,continue firm (which may happen by security,negligence,or private impediments),or the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion,undoes today all that was concluded yesterday.

Fourthly,that a monarch cannot disagree with himself,out of envy or interest;but an assembly may;and that to such a height as may produce a civil war.

Fifthly,that in monarchy there is this inconvenience;that any subject,by the power of one man,for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer,may be deprived of all he possesseth;which I confess is a great an inevitable inconvenience.But the same may as well happen where the sovereign power is in an assembly:for their power is the same;and they are as subject to evil counsel,and to be seduced by orators,as a monarch by flatterers;and becoming one another's flatterers,serve one another's covetousness and ambition by turns.

And whereas the favourites of monarchs are few,and they have none else to advance but their own kindred;the favourites of an assembly are many,and the kindred much more numerous than of any monarch.

Besides,there is no favourite of a monarch which cannot as well succour his friends as hurt his enemies:but orators,that is to say,favourites of sovereign assemblies,though they have great power to hurt,have little to save.For to accuse requires less eloquence (such is man's nature)than to excuse;and condemnation,than absolution,more resembles justice.