第53章 OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS BY INSTITUTION(3)
Eleventhly,to the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding with riches or honour;and of punishing with corporal or pecuniary punishment,or with ignominy,every subject according to the law he hath formerly made;or if there be no law made,according as he shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the Commonwealth,or deterring of them from doing disservice to the same.
Lastly,considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon themselves,what respect they look for from others,and how little they value other men;from whence continually arise amongst them,emulation,quarrels,factions,and at last war,to the destroying of one another,and diminution of their strength against a common enemy;it is necessary that there be laws of honour,and a public rate of the worth of such men as have deserved or are able to deserve well of the Commonwealth,and that there be force in the hands of some or other to put those laws in execution.But it hath already been shown that not only the whole militia,or forces of the Commonwealth,but also the judicature of all controversies,is annexed to the sovereignty.To the sovereign therefore it belonged also to give titles of honour,and to appoint what order of place and dignity each man shall hold,and what signs of respect in public or private meetings they shall give to one another.
These are the rights which make the essence of sovereignty,and which are the marks whereby a man may discern in what man,or assembly of men,the sovereign power is placed and resideth.For these are incommunicable and inseparable.The power to coin money,to dispose of the estate and persons of infant heirs,to have pre-emption in markets,and all other statute prerogatives may be transferred by the sovereign,and yet the power to protect his subjects be retained.But if he transfer the militia,he retains the judicature in vain,for want of execution of the laws;or if he grant away the power of raising money,the militia is in vain;or if he give away the government of doctrines,men will be frighted into rebellion with the fear of spirits.And so if we consider any one of the said rights,we shall presently see that the holding of all the rest will produce no effect in the conservation of peace and justice,the end for which all Commonwealths are instituted.And this division is it whereof it is said,a kingdom divided in itself cannot stand:for unless this division precede,division into opposite armies can never happen.If there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of England that these powers were divided between the King and the Lords and the House of Commons,the people had never been divided and fallen into this Civil War;first between those that disagreed in politics,and after between the dissenters about the liberty of religion,which have so instructed men in this point of sovereign right that there be few now in England that do not see that these rights are inseparable,and will be so generally acknowledged at the next return of peace;and so continue,till their miseries are forgotten,and no longer,except the vulgar be better taught than they have hitherto been.
And because they are essential and inseparable rights,it follows necessarily that in whatsoever words any of them seem to be granted away,yet if the sovereign power itself be not in direct terms renounced and the name of sovereign no more given by the grantees to him that grants them,the grant is void:for when he has granted all he can,if we grant back the sovereignty,all is restored,as inseparably annexed thereunto.
This great authority being indivisible,and inseparably annexed to the sovereignty,there is little ground for the opinion of them that say of sovereign kings,though they be singulis majores,of greater power than every one of their subjects,yet they be universis minores,of less power than them all together.For if by all together,they mean not the collective body as one person,then all together and every one signify the same;and the speech is absurd.But if by all together,they understand them as one person (which person the sovereign bears),then the power of all together is the same with the sovereign's power;and so again the speech is absurd:which absurdity they see well enough when the sovereignty is in an assembly of the people;but in a monarch they see it not;and yet the power of sovereignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed.
And as the power,so also the honour of the sovereign,ought to be greater than that of any or all the subjects.For in the sovereignty is the fountain of honour.The dignities of lord,earl,duke,and prince are his creatures.As in the presence of the master,the servants are equal,and without any honour at all;so are the subjects,in the presence of the sovereign.And though they shine some more,some less,when they are out of his sight;yet in his presence,they shine no more than the stars in presence of the sun.
But a man may here object that the condition of subjects is very miserable,as being obnoxious to the lusts and other irregular passions of him or them that have so unlimited a power in their hands.