第42章 OF OTHER LAWS OF NATURE(1)

FROM that law of nature by which we are obliged to transfer to another such rights as,being retained,hinder the peace of mankind,there followeth a third;which is this:that men perform their covenants made;without which covenants are in vain,and but empty words;and the right of all men to all things remaining,we are still in the condition of war.

And in this law of nature consisteth the fountain and original of justice.For where no covenant hath preceded,there hath no right been transferred,and every man has right to everything and consequently,no action can be unjust.But when a covenant is made,then to break it is unjust and the definition of injustice is no other than the not performance of covenant.And whatsoever is not unjust is just.

But because covenants of mutual trust,where there is a fear of not performance on either part (as hath been said in the former chapter),are invalid,though the original of justice be the making of covenants,yet injustice actually there can be none till the cause of such fear be taken away;which,while men are in the natural condition of war,cannot be done.Therefore before the names of just and unjust can have place,there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants,by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant,and to make good that propriety which by mutual contract men acquire in recompense of the universal right they abandon:and such power there is none before the erection of a Commonwealth.And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of justice in the Schools,for they say that justice is the constant will of giving to every man his own.And therefore where there is no own,that is,no propriety,there is no injustice;and where there is no coercive power erected,that is,where there is no Commonwealth,there is no propriety,all men having right to all things:therefore where there is no Commonwealth,there nothing is unjust.So that the nature of justice consisteth in keeping of valid covenants,but the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power sufficient to compel men to keep them:

and then it is also that propriety begins.

The fool hath said in his heart,there is no such thing as justice,and sometimes also with his tongue,seriously alleging that every man's conservation and contentment being committed to his own care,there could be no reason why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto:and therefore also to make,or not make;keep,or not keep,covenants was not against reason when it conduced to one's benefit.He does not therein deny that there be covenants;and that they are sometimes broken,sometimes kept;and that such breach of them may be called injustice,and the observance of them justice:but he questioneth whether injustice,taking away the fear of God (for the same fool hath said in his heart there is no God),not sometimes stand with that reason which dictateth to every man his own good;and particularly then,when it conduceth to such a benefit as shall put a man in a condition to neglect not only the dispraise and revilings,but also the power of other men.The kingdom of God is gotten by violence:but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence?Were it against reason so to get it,when it is impossible to receive hurt by it?And if it be not against reason,it is not against justice:or else justice is not to be approved for good.

From such reasoning as this,successful wickedness hath obtained the name of virtue:and some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of faith,yet have allowed it when it is for the getting of a kingdom.And the heathen that believed that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter believed nevertheless the same Jupiter to be the avenger of injustice,somewhat like to a piece of law in Coke's Commentaries on Littleton;where he says if the right heir of the crown be attainted of treason,yet the crown shall descend to him,and eo instante the attainder be void:from which instances a man will be very prone to infer that when the heir apparent of a kingdom shall kill him that is in possession,though his father,you may call it injustice,or by what other name you will;yet it can never be against reason,seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit of themselves;and those actions are most reasonable that conduce most to their ends.This specious reasoning is nevertheless false.

For the question is not of promises mutual,where there is no security of performance on either side,as when there is no civil power erected over the parties promising;for such promises are no covenants:but either where one of the parties has performed already,or where there is a power to make him perform,there is the question whether it be against reason;that is,against the benefit of the other to perform,or not.And I say it is not against reason.