第38章 OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURAL LAWS(1)

THE right of nature,which writers commonly call jus naturale,is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature;that is to say,of his own life;and consequently,of doing anything which,in his own judgement and reason,he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.

By liberty is understood,according to the proper signification of the word,the absence of external impediments;which impediments may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would,but cannot hinder him from using the power left him according as his judgement and reason shall dictate to him.

A law of nature,lex naturalis,is a precept,or general rule,found out by reason,by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life,or taketh away the means of preserving the same,and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.For though they that speak of this subject use to confound jus and lex,right and law,yet they ought to be distinguished,because right consisteth in liberty to do,or to forbear;whereas law determineth and bindeth to one of them:so that law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty,which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

And because the condition of man (as hath been declared in the precedent chapter)is a condition of war of every one against every one,in which case every one is governed by his own reason,and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his enemies;it followeth that in such a condition every man has a right to every thing,even to one another's body.And therefore,as long as this natural right of every man to every thing endureth,there can be no security to any man,how strong or wise soever he be,of living out the time which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live.And consequently it is a precept,or general rule of reason:that every man ought to endeavour peace,as far as he has hope of obtaining it;and when he cannot obtain it,that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war.The first branch of which rule containeth the first and fundamental law of nature,which is:to seek peace and follow it.

The second,the sum of the right of nature,which is:by all means we can to defend ourselves.

From this fundamental law of nature,by which men are commanded to endeavour peace,is derived this second law:that a man be willing,when others are so too,as far forth as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary,to lay down this right to all things;and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself.For as long as every man holdeth this right,of doing anything he liketh;so long are all men in the condition of war.But if other men will not lay down their right,as well as he,then there is no reason for anyone to divest himself of his:for that were to expose himself to prey,which no man is bound to,rather than to dispose himself to peace.This is that law of the gospel:Whatsoever you require that others should do to you,that do ye to them.And that law of all men,quod tibi fieri non vis,alteri ne feceris.

To lay down a man's right to anything is to divest himself of the liberty of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to the same.For he that renounceth or passeth away his right giveth not to any other man a right which he had not before,because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature,but only standeth out of his way that he may enjoy his own original right without hindrance from him,not without hindrance from another.So that the effect which redoundeth to one man by another man's defect of right is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own right original.

Right is laid aside,either by simply renouncing it,or by transferring it to another.By simply renouncing,when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth.By transferring,when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person or persons.And when a man hath in either manner abandoned or granted away his right,then is he said to be obliged,or bound,not to hinder those to whom such right is granted,or abandoned,from the benefit of it:

and that he ought,and it is duty,not to make void that voluntary act of his own:and that such hindrance is injustice,and injury,as being sine jure;the right being before renounced or transferred.So that injury or injustice,in the controversies of the world,is somewhat like to that which in the disputations of scholars is called absurdity.For as it is there called an absurdity to contradict what one maintained in the beginning;so in the world it is called injustice,and injury voluntarily to undo that which from the beginning he had voluntarily done.The way by which a man either simply renounceth or transferreth his right is a declaration,or signification,by some voluntary and sufficient sign,or signs,that he doth so renounce or transfer,or hath so renounced or transferred the same,to him that accepteth it.And these signs are either words only,or actions only;or,as it happeneth most often,both words and actions.And the same are the bonds,by which men are bound and obliged:bonds that have their strength,not from their own nature (for nothing is more easily broken than a man's word),but from fear of some evil consequence upon the rupture.

Whensoever a man transferreth his right,or renounceth it,it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself,or for some other good he hopeth for thereby.For it is a voluntary act:and of the voluntary acts of every man,the object is some good to himself.And therefore there be some rights which no man can be understood by any words,or other signs,to have abandoned or transferred.As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force to take away his life,because he cannot be understood to aim thereby at any good to himself.