第19章 OF THE VIRTUES COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUAL(1)

VIRTUE generally,in all sorts of subjects,is somewhat that is valued for eminence;and consisteth in comparison.For if all things were equally in all men,nothing would be prized.And by virtues intellectual are always understood such abilities of the mind as men praise,value,and desire should be in themselves;and go commonly under the name of a good wit;though the same word,wit,be used also to distinguish one certain ability from the rest.

These virtues are of two sorts;natural and acquired.By natural,I mean not that which a man hath from his birth:for that is nothing else but sense;wherein men differ so little one from another,and from brute beasts,as it is not to be reckoned amongst virtues.But I mean that wit which is gotten by use only,and experience,without method,culture,or instruction.This natural wit consisteth principally in two things:celerity of imagining (that is,swift succession of one thought to another);and steady direction to some approved end.On the contrary,a slow imagination maketh that defect or fault of the mind which is commonly called dullness,stupidity,and sometimes by other names that signify slowness of motion,or difficulty to be moved.

And this difference of quickness is caused by the difference of men's passions;that love and dislike,some one thing,some another:

and therefore some men's thoughts run one way,some another,and are held to,observe differently the things that pass through their imagination.And whereas in this succession of men's thoughts there is nothing to observe in the things they think on,but either in what they be like one another,or in what they be unlike,or what they serve for,or how they serve to such a purpose;those that observe their similitudes,in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others,are said to have a good wit;by which,in this occasion,is meant a good fancy.But they that observe their differences,and dissimilitudes,which is called distinguishing,and discerning,and judging between thing and thing,in case such discerning be not easy,are said to have a good judgement:and particularly in matter of conversation and business,wherein times,places,and persons are to be discerned,this virtue is called discretion.The former,that is,fancy,without the help of judgement,is not commended as a virtue;but the latter which is judgement,and discretion,is commended for itself,without the help of fancy.Besides the discretion of times,places,and persons,necessary to a good fancy,there is required also an often application of his thoughts to their end;that is to say,to some use to be made of them.This done,he that hath this virtue will be easily fitted with similitudes that will please,not only by illustration of his discourse,and adorning it with new and apt metaphors,but also,by the rarity of their invention.But without steadiness,and direction to some end,great fancy is one kind of madness;such as they have that,entering into any discourse,are snatched from their purpose by everything that comes in their thought,into so many and so long digressions and parentheses,that they utterly lose themselves:which kind of folly I know no particular name for:but the cause of it is sometimes want of experience;whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare which doth not so to others:sometimes pusillanimity;by which that seems great to him which other men think a trifle:and whatsoever is new,or great,and therefore thought fit to be told,withdraws a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse.

In a good poem,whether it be epic or dramatic,as also in sonnets,epigrams,and other pieces,both judgement and fancy are required:but the fancy must be more eminent;because they please for the extravagancy,but ought not to displease by indiscretion.

In a good history,the judgement must be eminent;because the goodness consisteth in the choice of the method,in the truth,and in the choice of the actions that are most profitable to be known.

Fancy has no place,but only in adorning the style.

In orations of praise,and in invectives,the fancy is predominant;because the design is not truth,but to honour or dishonour;which is done by noble or by vile comparisons.The judgement does but suggest what circumstances make an action laudable or culpable.

In hortatives and pleadings,as truth or disguise serveth best to the design in hand,so is the judgement or the fancy most required.

In demonstration,in council,and all rigorous search of truth,sometimes does all;except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude,and then there is so much use of fancy.

But for metaphors,they are in this case utterly excluded.For seeing they openly profess deceit,to admit them into council,or reasoning,were manifest folly.

And in any discourse whatsoever,if the defect of discretion be apparent,how extravagant soever the fancy be,the whole discourse will be taken for a sign of want of wit;and so will it never when the discretion is manifest,though the fancy be never so ordinary.