第14章 OF THE INTERIOR BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY MOTIONS(2)

Those things which we neither desire nor hate,we are said to contemn:contempt being nothing else but an immobility or contumacy of the heart in resisting the action of certain things;and proceeding from that the heart is already moved otherwise,by other more potent objects,or from want of experience of them.

And because the constitution of a man's body is in continual mutation,it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same appetites and aversions:much less can all men consent in the desire of almost any one and the same object.

But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire,that is it which he for his part calleth good;and the object of his hate and aversion,evil;and of his contempt,vile and inconsiderable.

For these words of good,evil,and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth them:there being nothing simply and absolutely so;nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves;but from the person of the man,where there is no Commonwealth;or,in a Commonwealth,from the person that representeth it;or from an arbitrator or judge,whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up and make his sentence the rule thereof.

The Latin tongue has two words whose significations approach to those of good and evil,but are not precisely the same;and those are pulchrum and turpe.Whereof the former signifies that which by some apparent signs promiseth good;and the latter,that which promiseth evil.But in our tongue we have not so general names to express them by.But for pulchrum we say in some things,fair;in others,beautiful,or handsome,or gallant,or honourable,or comely,or amiable:and for turpe;foul,deformed,ugly,base,nauseous,and the like,as the subject shall require;all which words,in their proper places,signify nothing else but the mien,or countenance,that promiseth good and evil.So that of good there be three kinds:good in the promise,that is pulchrum;good in effect,as the end desired,which is called jucundum,delightful;and good as the means,which is called utile,profitable;and as many of evil:for evil in promise is that they call turpe;evil in effect and end is molestum,unpleasant,troublesome;and evil in the means,inutile,unprofitable,hurtful.

As in sense that which is really within us is,as I have said before,only motion,caused by the action of external objects but in appearance;to the sight,light and colour;to the ear,sound;to the nostril,odour,etc.:so,when the action of the same object is continued from the eyes,ears,and other organs to the heart,the real effect there is nothing but motion,or endeavour;which consisteth in appetite or aversion to or from the object moving.But the appearance or sense of that motion is that we either call delight or trouble of mind.

This motion,which is called appetite,and for the appearance of it delight and pleasure,seemeth to be a corroboration of vital motion,and a help thereunto;and therefore such things as caused delight were not improperly called jucunda (a juvando),from helping or fortifying;and the contrary,molesta,offensive,from hindering and troubling the motion vital.

Pleasure therefore,or delight,is the appearance or sense of good;and molestation or displeasure,the appearance or sense of evil.

And consequently all appetite,desire,and love is accompanied with some delight more or less;and all hatred and aversion with more or less displeasure and offence.

Of pleasures,or delights,some arise from the sense of an object present;and those may be called pleasures of sense (the word sensual,as it is used by those only that condemn them,having no place till there be laws).Of this kind are all onerations and exonerations of the body;as also all that is pleasant,in the sight,hearing,smell,taste,or touch.Others arise from the expectation that proceeds from foresight of the end or consequence of things,whether those things in the sense please or displease:and these are pleasures of the mind of him that draweth in those consequences,and are generally called joy.In the like manner,displeasures are some in the sense,and called pain;others,in the expectation of consequences,and are called grief.

These simple passions called appetite,desire,love,aversion,hate,joy,and grief have their names for diverse considerations diversified.At first,when they one succeed another,they are diversely called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire.Secondly,from the object loved or hated.Thirdly,from the consideration of many of them together.

Fourthly,from the alteration or succession itself.

For appetite with an opinion of attaining is called hope.

The same,without such opinion,despair.

Aversion,with opinion of hurt from the object,fear.

The same,with hope of avoiding that hurt by resistence,courage.

Sudden courage,anger.

Constant hope,confidence of ourselves.

Constant despair,diffidence of ourselves.

Anger for great hurt done to another,when we conceive the same to be done by injury,indignation.

Desire of good to another,benevolence,good will,charity.If to man generally,good nature.

Desire of riches,covetousness:a name used always in signification of blame,because men contending for them are displeased with one another's attaining them;though the desire in itself be to be blamed,or allowed,according to the means by which those riches are sought.

Desire of office,or precedence,ambition:a name used also in the worse sense,for the reason before mentioned.

Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends,and fear of things that are but of little hindrance,pusillanimity.

Contempt of little helps,and hindrances,magnanimity.

Magnanimity in danger of death,or wounds,valour,fortitude.

Magnanimity in the use of riches,liberality.